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Abstract: We investigate the relationship between risk attitudes, choice consis-
tency and field behavior of children by conducting economic experiments with 1,275
8th graders. Choices are not completely consistent with any of the economic theories
we consider, however, they are not random either. We use our experimental data to
structurally estimate risk preferences and correct for decision error. Using a measure
constructed from the estimates and individual choices, we find that risk preferences
do predict future field behavior. Children who are more risk averse are less likely to
receive disciplinary referrals one and two years after the experiment and are more
likely to complete high school, even controlling for economic rationality, family back-
ground, scholarly achievement and past misbehavior. Accounting for decision error
turns out to be important as a simple aggregate measure of risk is not found to be
correlated with field behavior.
1. Introduction
According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), 29,551 individuals aged 15-
24 died in 2010. Of those deaths, 20.7 percent were due to accidental discharge
of firearms, accidental poisoning, exposure to noxious substances, and assault. By
comparison, the frequency of these causes of death in the rest of the population is
1.5 percent. As reported by childrenstats.gov, the percent of 8th graders who admit
using drugs is 7.7, and of the 47.4 percent who say they have had sex, three-quarters
did not use contraceptives and 40 percent did not use a condom. While many of
these behaviors may be viewed as imprudent, some could be considered economically
rational if, for example, the returns to illegal activities are high or a child is willing
to take risks. We investigate these type of behaviors more generally by asking two
questions: (1) Are children’s choices over risky outcomes rational, in that they are
consistent with economic theory? and (2) Do risk preferences predict field behavior?
We address these questions by collecting experimental and field behavior on 1,275
8th graders.
Several reasons motivate studying the nature of children’s preferences and their
relationship with field behavior. First, children make many decisions on their own,
independent of their parents, and these decisions have important consequences for
future economic outcomes. For instance, recent studies from labor economics show
that misbehavior during childhood and adolescence have long term consequences on
earnings (Segal, 2013; Heckman et al., 2006). Second, economic theory (Freeman,
1999) suggests that children’s behavior must respond to both the relative costs to
human capital accumulation and their preferences. So, examining the link between
risk preferences and field behavior should be fruitful. Third, measurement error
may be important when relating experimental estimates of preferences to outcomes.
Misbehavior and high school completion are relevant outcomes that can be used to
test the extent of the error and our proposed methodology to correct for it.
We aim to improve our understanding of risk preferences, economic rationality
and field behavior by using several data collection methods. Information on the
child’s household environment is gathered with a survey. High school completion,
past and future misbehavior come from school records, and risk preferences are mea-
sured using incentivized economic experiments. Measuring preferences with exper-
iments is advantageous because this allows us to observe the behavior of children
from various backgrounds over identical choice sets. Similarly, data on household
environment are potentially informative of the barriers some children might face in
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attempting to accumulate human capital.1 An important component of our study
is a brief survey on family structure completed by children participating in the ex-
periment. This drastically reduces the loss of information due to non-response from
mailed surveys to parents and allows us to control for variables that might be cor-
related with behavior in the experiment and the field. To control for the influence
of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities (Heckman et al., 2006), we use standardized
test scores and disciplinary referrals prior to the experiment.2
We look at the effect of children’s risk preferences on field behavior, as mea-
sured by disciplinary referrals one to two years after the experiment and high school
completion five years later. While field behavior is likely to be influenced by many
factors that are difficult to measure, we add various controls to reduce the potential
for omitted variables.
Before relating measures of risk preferences to field behavior, however, it is crucial
to determine what these experimental measures of risk reveal. It would be inappro-
priate to interpret choices in experiments as a measure of preferences if they are made
randomly and are not consistent with theory. Even if children possess well-behaved
preferences over risky prospects, they might be distorted in experiments because the
child is not paying attention or makes execution mistakes. This measurement error
could make it difficult to detect a relationship between preferences and field behavior
even if one exists. To address these issues, our experimental design is constructed
specifically to detect rational behavior through a series of lottery decisions. The gen-
erated data permit us to structurally estimate a decision model and identify whether
children’s choices are consistent with various theories of decision-making under risk
and to what extent choices are noisy. We test consistency with expected utility
theory, but also with less restrictive models of behavior such as Neilson (1992a),
Diecidue et al. (2004), and cumulative prospect theory.
We have several key results. First, children’s choices systematically deviate from
decision patterns predicted by the theories of decision-making under risk we consider,
including expected utility, as well as non-expected utility theory. While choices are
1For instance, children in two-parent households might face higher costs to misbehaving. While
personality might also be important in explaining behavior, we do not have these measures. Instead,
we control for household environment and past misbehavior.
2While disciplinary referrals and test scores are imperfect measures of cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities (Heckman et al., 2006), achievement tests have been found to be correlated with personality
traits (see Borghans et al. (2011)). A comprehensive approach would take into consideration mea-
surement error in risk preferences as well as skills (Cunha et al., 2010). We examine measurement
error in the former but not the latter.
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not completely consistent with these theories, children are not choosing randomly.
Using the approach of Harless and Camerer (1994), we find that, once we allow for
errors in decision making and compare across theories, expected utility is as good as
other models at explaining behavior (Vuong, 1989).
Second, we introduce a new estimate of risk preferences that corrects for mea-
surement error due to decision mistakes. Assuming an expected utility model of
decision making, we structurally estimate the conditional probability that a child
has a certain set of preferences given the pattern of errors in the population and
the actual choices made by the child in the experiment. The estimates from the
structural model are then used to construct a risk preference measure that corrects
for decision error.
Third, when our constructed risk preference measure is correlated with field be-
havior, we find that a child who is more risk averse is less likely to have future
disciplinary referrals and more likely to complete high school. This holds even con-
trolling for economic rationality, past disciplinary referrals, scholastic performance
and family background. The magnitude of the effect of risk preferences on complet-
ing high school is large (e.g. equivalent to a one standard deviation change in 8th
grade math scores). It is worth noting that the disciplinary referrals we use in the
analysis occurred one and two years after the children completed our experiment and
high school completion occurred five years later. This means that our results show
a relationship between an estimated risk preference measure and future behavior.
Finally, having a measure of preferences that accounts for decision error turns
out to be crucial to uncover a relationship with field behavior. The correlation
between risk aversion and disciplinary referrals is only statistically and economically
significant if we use our estimate of risk preferences that corrects for measurement
error. If we ignore error and use an aggregate measure of lottery choices or each
separate lottery decision to explain discipline, we find no significant correlation.
Similar correlation patterns exist for high school completion as well. These results
highlight that experimental measures could be imprecise due to measurement error
(see Kimball et al. (2006, 2008); Gillen et al. (2015); Beauchamp et al. (2011)).
Very little is known about whether children’s decisions under risk are consistent
with economic theory. Harbaugh et al. (2002) examine the risk attitudes of children
and test for deviations from expected utility, but they do not test for consistency
with other economic theories of decision-making under uncertainty. Our findings
are consistent with studies using adults (Harless and Camerer, 1994) and a similar
instrument to measure risk preferences. As in previous research (Jacobson and Petrie
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(2009); Ashraf et al. (2006)), we find that a significant proportion of choices in a risky
setting can be attributed to decision error.
A main contribution of our study is uncovering the importance of measurement
error when estimating children’s risk preferences and correlating them with future
field behavior. If individuals make mistakes when choosing among risky alternatives,
then it would be important to account for this when estimating risk preferences.3
Underlying relationships with field behavior could be obscured with a preference
measure that does not account for decision error. In addition, our findings contribute
to the small but growing body of results showing significant correlations between
choices in experiments and future field behavior (Buser et al., 2014; Castillo et al.,
2011).4
Our results also speak to policy design. Incentive schemes in schools designed to
promote investment in human capital are likely to have a differential impact across
children if the decision to participate reflects a child’s underlying preferences. If
children who are more likely to take risks, and misbehave, are less likely to invest in
human capital, then incentives could merely be a transfer to children who would have
invested in human capital anyway. The recent experience providing children mon-
etary payments to improve scholarly performance (Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Fryer,
2011) provides a cautionary tale. Preferences may interact in important ways with
offered incentives and have an impact on the success of policies. Our study sug-
gests that children might be tolerant of incentive schemes that bear significant risks
(e.g. tournaments). Policies aimed at fostering human capital accumulation might
consider this.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the risk instrument used
in the experiments and how it can detect irrational behavior relative to the theories
3In general, error has been shown to be important in estimating preferences (Kimball et al., 2006,
2008; von Gaudecker et al., 2011). Beauchamp et al. (2011) use data from adults to show that once
measurement error is accounted for risk preferences predict field behavior. More generally, there is
growing evidence that measurement error is an issue when estimating preferences from experimental
data. Gillen et al. (2015) present compelling evidence that error in experimental measures of risk
preferences can severely underestimate its importance in explaining behavior.
4Several studies have examined the correlation between experimental preference measures and
contemporaneous outcomes. Sutter et al. (2013) control for both risk and time preferences of
children when correlating with field behavior and find time preferences to be a stronger predictor
than risk. Angerer et al. (2015) explore the relationship between both risk and time preferences and
donations to a real charity among children and find risk and time preferences to have a nonlinear
relationship with donations. Survey measures of risk preferences have also been correlated with
field behavior in adults (Dohmen et al., 2011; Kimball et al., 2008; Jaeger et al., 2010; Bonin et al.,
2007; Burks et al., 2009).
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we consider. The section also describes the experimental implementation. Section 3
presents results, including summary statistics, a description of rational behavior, an
estimation of risk preferences, the relationship between theories of rationality and
individual characteristics, and the correlation between rationality, risk preferences,
disciplinary referrals and high school completion. Section 4 concludes.
2. Experimental Design and Implementation
In this section, we describe the experimental design and implementation. We also
show how the design can be used to measure risk preferences and test for consistency
with alternative models of decision-making under uncertainty.
2.1. Design
The experimental design, based on Chew and Waller (1986), requires three or-
dered payoffs, xL < xM < xH , two alternative lotteries, A = (xM , 1) and B =
(xH , α;xL, 1− α), and a parameter 0 < β < 1 which specifies how the A and B lot-
teries and payoffs are combined into new lotteries used in the experiment.5 Subjects
make five decisions, and each decision consists of choosing one out of two lotteries.
The lotteries used in the five decisions are constructed from the three payoffs, the A
and B lotteries and β.6 The five-decision design has the advantage of being simple
for the children and gives us data that allow for a robust test of rationality.7 A
simpler design of choosing one lottery from many options (e.g. Binswanger (1981))
or a multiple price list of binary lottery choices (e.g. Holt and Laury (2002)) would
not provide data rich enough to distinguish between various models of behavior.
We have two designs, the on-border design and the off-border design, which only
differ in the possibility of receiving a certain payoff. We will first discuss the set-up
5Lotteries A and B are referred to as pair O. Chew and Waller (1986) called their design HILO,
from high (H), intermediate (I) and low (L) outcomes plus lottery O.
6These are devised such that we can test for Allais’ paradox (the common consequence effect)
and the common ratio property of expected utility. Allais’ paradox is tested by comparing what we
call decisions D1 and D2, and the common ratio property is tested by comparing choices in decision
D3 and D2.
7An alternative design could have been Choi et al. (2007), however, this would have been much
more difficult to implement in our setting since it requires more decisions and computer terminals.
Our design uses only paper and pencil, and more importantly, it allows us to examine a larger set
of theories of behavior (see Polisson and Quah (2013)). This is important because we would like to
distinguish between systematic deviations from theory and noisy behavior.
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of the on-border design. The off-border design is very similiar and discussed later in
this section. In the on-border design, xL = $0, xM = $30, xH = $40, α = 0.8 and
β = 0.25.8 The off-border design shares the same ordered payoffs and β.
Figure 1 presents the lotteries used in both of our designs in the Marshack-
Machina (MM) triangle (Machina, 1987). The left panel shows the on-border design,
and the right panel shows the off-border design. Figure 2 shows the decision sheets
used in the on-border design treatment, and Figure 3 shows the decision sheets used
in the off-border design treatment.9 For the on-border design, in Figure 1 (left-
panel), each decision is represented by two solid dots connected by a line. The dots
represent the two lottery options for that decision. The five decisions which subjects
make are labelled D1, D2, D3, D4 and D5 in the figures. By construction, along
each line, the bottom left lottery is the safer (S) option, and the upper right lottery
is the riskier (R) option. In Figures 2 and 3, for each decision, option A is the safer
lottery.
An expected utility maximizer would choose either all safe or all risky options
since his/her indifference curves are linear and parallel (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
The possible choice patterns over the five decisions for an expected utility maximizer
would be SSSSS or RRRRR. Other choice patterns are possible if we consider
alternative models of behavior. For instance, linear, but not parallel, indifference
curves as in Dekel (1986), Gul (1991) and Neilson (1992a) require only that choices
satisfy expected utility along each separate line. This property is called betweenness.
Models of preferences for certainty like that of Diecidue et al. (2004) and Bleichrodt
and Schmidt (2002) predict that behavior will follow expected utility theory except
for lottery A which gives $30 with certainty. Other models, like Neilson (1992b) and
cumulative prospect theory, produce richer patterns of behavior. We consider six
theories of behavior under uncertainty, including expected and non-expected utility,
and the choice patterns each theory predicts. These are detailed in Table A1 in
Appendix A.10
Our on-border design has the advantage of being simple and compact. However,
8The five decisions used in the experiment are constructed as follows. D1 compares βA ⊕ (1 −
β)xM and βB ⊕ (1 − β)xM . D2 compares βA ⊕ (1 − β)xL and βB ⊕ (1 − β)xL. D3 compares A
and B. D4 compares βB ⊕ (1− β)xM and B. D5 compares βA⊕ (1− β)xH and βB ⊕ (1− β)xH .
9The decision sheets used by subjects to make their decision in the experiment are included in
Appendix B.
10The theories considered are betweenness, Neilson (1992b), Diecidue et al. (2004), cumulative
prospect theory with convex weighting function, cumulative prospect theory with concave weighting
function, and expected utility theory.
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as noted by Sopher and Gigliotti (1993) and Conslik (1989), this design might over-
state departures from expected utility if choices are different when certain options are
available than when none are available. That is, the on-border design might reject the
null hypothesis of expected utility too often. To test the robustness of the results, we
created our off-border design. This design only has pairs of lotteries which do not in-
clude a certain option. These are based on lotteries A? = (xH , 0.16;xM , 0.8;xL, 0.04)
and B? = (xH , 0.64;xM , 0.2, xL, 0.16).
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None of the lotteries in the off-border design involve complete certainty, and
all are within the borders of the Marshack-Machina triangle. These lotteries are
presented in the right-side panel in Figure 1 as open dots. Notice that the two
options available for each decision in either the on-border or off-border designs lie
on the same line. The on-border decisions (solid dots) may include options where a
certain payoff is available, and the off-border decisions (open dots) have no options
with certain payoffs.
2.2. Implementation and Data Collection
In each experimental session, subjects are assigned a unique identification code.
This code is private, and subjects do not know the identification codes of other
subjects. Instructions are given orally by reading from a script, and a bingo cage with
numbered balls is used to represent probabilities (e.g. out of 20 balls, those numbered
1-15 pay $30 and those numbered 16-20 pay $40).12 During the instructions, several
written examples are used to make sure subjects understand probabilities, to show
that payoffs are tied to probabilities and to make clear the nature of the decision
task. To maximize comprehension, subjects write down the answers to the examples,
and any questions are addressed.
Upon completion of the instructions and questions, subjects make their choices
privately by circling option A or option B on the decision sheet for each of the five
decisions.13 Only one decision is shown on each page, and subjects are free to move
11The five new decisions are created in a similar manner to the on-border design, using the
following rule: A?i = βA
?⊕ (1−β)xi and B?i = βB?⊕ (1−β)xi for i = L,M,H. In particular, D1?
compares βA?⊕(1−β)xM and βB?⊕(1−β)xM . D2? compares βA?⊕(1−β)xL and βB?⊕(1−β)xL.
D3? compares A? and B?. D4? compares βB?⊕ (1−β)xM and B?. D5? compares βA?⊕ (1−β)xH
and βB? ⊕ (1 − β)xH . These lotteries are constructed using the same value of β as the original
lotteries.
12The decision sheet the subject sees has numbers next to various payments. The number on the
ball that comes out of the bingo cage determines which payment is realized.
13Subjects made an additional lottery decision that is not analyzed in this paper. The additional
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back and forth between pages when making their choices. After completing their
choices, a subject puts her decision sheets in an envelope with her identification
code written discretely on the bottom and the envelopes of all subjects are collected.
Subjects then complete a short survey about family structure, parent’s education and
number of siblings. This survey is put in a separate envelope with the identification
code and also collected.
Once all the envelopes are collected, one of the decisions is chosen at random for
payment by taking index cards with the decision numbers written on them, shuffling
them in front of the subjects, presenting them “face down,” and asking a subject
to choose one card. The number on the selected card is the decision number to
be paid for the three subjects in each session who are randomly chosen to receive
payment. Upon selecting a decision to be paid, the bingo cage is turned to select a ball
numbered between 1 and 20. The selected ball determines the payoff corresponding
to the subject’s choice (A or B) for that decision.14 For example, if decision 1 (D1)
in the on-border design was chosen for payment, and the number chosen from the
bingo cage was 18, the subject would earn $30 if she chose option A and $40 if she
chose option B.
After determining the decision to be paid and the amount to be paid for choosing
option A or option B, all the envelopes with the decision sheets are shuffled in front
of the subjects, and three envelopes are chosen for payment. This is done in each
session. The identification codes of those chosen to receive payment are written on
the blackboard. Because identification codes are kept private by each subject, no
other subject knows which subjects have been chosen to receive payment. Those
who are chosen to receive payment are paid with a Wal-Mart gift card within a few
days of the experiment.15 The subjects who are chosen to be paid go privately to the
principal’s office to pick up their gift cards, and their names and payment are kept
confidential. Subjects know all of these procedures before making their decisions.
decision varied across classrooms and is therefore controlled for with classroom fixed effects in the
regression results. The decision sheets the subjects used to make their choices in the on-border and
off-border designs, as well as the survey, are in Appendix B.
14In the on-border design, the bingo cage had 20 numbered balls to make the decision task simpler.
In the off-border design, because we had probabilities of less than 5%, there were 100 numbered
balls.
15In order to minimize using up classroom time, we paid subjects a day or two later. We chose
to pay with a Wal-Mart gift card because it minimizes potential problems associated with giving
children cash and it can be transformed into many goods that children desire, so it is very similar
to cash. In addition, it cannot be used for alcohol, tobacco, or firearms purchases by anyone. The
school administration did not want us to use cash.
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All experiments were conducted by the authors. In total, 1,275 8th-grade students
participated. One hundred and twenty two students were randomly chosen to be paid,
and the average payment was $34.55.16 The experiments were conducted during the
school day in the home-room classrooms of the entire 8th-grade cohort of a county
in Georgia, USA during the 2008-2009 and 2011-2012 school years. All experimental
sessions in a particular school were completed sequentially during one morning or
afternoon to minimize the chance that students spoke to one another about the
experiment across sessions within a school.17 The experiment took 30 minutes to
complete, and the participation rate was very high, with about 95% of each 8th-
grade cohort completing the experiment.18 Subject characteristics are presented in
more detail in the next section.
The experimental data provide a measure of risk preferences, and the survey
data collected from the subjects after the experiment provide information on family
background and structure. In addition, the school district supplied information from
the student’s school records on gender, race, standardized math and reading scores,
whether the student qualified for free or reduced price school meals, high school
graduation status (graduated or not) and the number of disciplinary referrals the
student received in 7th, 8th and 9th grades.
A disciplinary referral happens when an offending student is sent to the adminis-
trative office (by a teacher, administrator or bus driver) and the behavior is entered
into the student’s official record (i.e. reprimand, detention, suspension, etc.). This
measure does not include referrals to the office that do not result in a recorded entry
in the student’s record. Because students move from middle school to high school
between 8th and 9th grades, the outcome measure of disciplinary referrals is from
two different sets of teachers and administrators. 7th and 8th grade referrals are from
middle school, and 9th grade referrals are from high school. This is an advantage for
our analysis because disciplinary referrals in 8th grade are an independent measure
of misbehavior from those in 9th grade.
16As in Harrison et al. (2002) and Andersen et al. (2008), a subsample of randomly-chosen
participants are paid.
17Spillover across sessions was extremely unlikely. The children were kept in their home rooms
while the experiments were conducted and were not allowed to interact with children seated in other
classrooms either waiting to participate in the experiment or having completed the experiment. The
children did not know the exact nature of the experiment prior to our arrival in the room to conduct
the session.
18Non-participation was primarily due to absence on the day the experiments were implemented.
We had only a handful of students across the three times the experiments were implemented who
declined to participate.
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All the data, from the school and the experiment, were anonymized to protect
students’ privacy.
3. Results
In this section we summarize the survey and school record data and describe
the experimental results and evidence of deviations from rational behavior. We
correlate rational behavior to individual characteristics, present our estimate of risk
preferences, and explore the relationship between rationality, risk preferences and
field behavior.
3.1. Description of the sample
Summary statistics of our sample are shown in Table 1. One half of the children
are male, and 44% are given a racial classification by the school district as black
and 48% as white. The average age is 13.8 years, and 34% of children report living
with one or no parent. These numbers hide the fact that 49% of black children
report living with one or no parent while only 22% of white children do. About
two thirds of children qualify for free or reduced price school meals. The average
number of disciplinary referrals is 1.56 in the 7th grade, 2.06 in the 8th grade and
1.33 in the 9th grade. While the number of referrals is highly correlated across 7th
and 8th grades (ρ = 0.5778, p-value < 0.0001), they are statistically significantly
different (t-test = -3.9976, p-value = 0.0001). The correlation between 8th and 9th
grade disciplinary referrals is 0.5695 (p-value < 0.0001)]. Figure 4 shows that the
distribution of referrals for 7th, 8th and 9th grades is skewed towards zero. For any
grade year, between 65 and 78 percent of children receive no referrals. Some 73% of
children in our sample are confirmed to have graduated high school.
3.2. Are choices consistent with theory or random?
The distributions of choices for each of the five decisions in the on-the-border
and off-the-border designs are presented in Table 2. These are significantly different
across the two designs (χ2 test of equality of distributions p-value = 0.000). The
modal choice is risk averse. In total, safe options (S) are chosen about three-fifths of
the time across both designs. Across decisions, the distribution is not uniform within
either design. This is contrary to what would be predicted by expected utility theory.
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For example, the proportion of times the safe option is chosen in the on-border design
varies from 51 to 69 percent across the five decisions. Also, consistent with previous
experiments, when the option of $30 for sure is available, as in D1 and D3 of the
on-the-border design, children are more likely to choose it (69% in D1 and 63% in
D3). The common consequence effect (or Allais Paradox) can be evaluated using
D1 and D2. The pattern typically found in previous experiments is for subjects to
choose S more frequently than R in D1 compared to D2. Table 2 shows that this
pattern is present in the on-the-border design, but the opposite pattern (from R to
S) emerges in the off-the-border design.
We turn now to examining whether choices are consistent with theory or ran-
dom.19 Harbaugh et al. (2001) have shown that children as young as eight years old
satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) when choosing be-
tween two certain goods and that this behavior is statistically significantly different
from random choice. Our design allows us to examine if this holds when choices are
made over uncertain outcomes.
We consider six theories of decision-making under uncertainty. While the list of
models is not exhaustive, some of the theories deviate significantly from expected
utility and therefore increase the chance of detecting whether choices are consistent
more broadly.20 The theories include (1) a model that requires that behavior satisfies
betweenness, (2) Neilson (1992a)’s model that allows for different utilities over certain
and uncertain payoffs depending on the cardinality of the prospect, (3) Diecidue et al.
(2004)’s model that allows for different utilities over certain and uncertain payoffs
only, (4) cumulative prospect theory (CPT) with a convex weighting function, (5)
CPT with a concave weighting function and (6) expected utility theory.
19Our measure of consistency with theory is valid independent of the underlying distribution of
preferences. Individual risk attitudes affect the distribution of patterns of behavior, but not whether
a person acts consistently. While the experimental design might not be well calibrated to capture
individual differences in risk attitudes, our design is still powerful enough to detect deviations from
behavior consistent with theory. For example, under expected utility theory, the calibration of the
experiment might affect whether a subject chose always S or always R, but not that he only chose
one of these two patterns. The distribution of underlying preferences, however, does affect the
power of the test of alternative theories of behavior under risk. That is, the calibration might affect
the relative, but not the absolute, performance of a particular model in rationalizing the data.
20Following the convention in the literature, we compare patterns of behavior to random choice.
Other patterns of “irrational” behavior could manifest, such as choosing all A’s. If so, it would be
difficult to distinguish this pattern from adherence to expected utility. For this reason, we examine
five additional theories that produce further patterns of behavior. Also, we might expect to see this
type of “irrationality” when the decision problem is more complex, e.g. in the off-border design.
However, the proportion of children choosing all A’s is not significantly different in the off-border
and on-border designs (13.2% in the on-border and 12.0% in in the off border, p-value=0.528).
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The property of betweennes was introduced by Dekel (1986) and requires that
an individual’s indifference curve be linear, but not necessarily parallel. Individuals
satisfying this property can behave in a way consistent with the common ratio and
common consequence effects. Neilson (1992a)’s model modifies the utility function
over money to reflect the cardinality of a lottery (the number of different possible
outcomes). This theory can explain a preference for certain outcomes, and it allows
for violations of the independence axiom when compound lotteries have more out-
comes than the originals. Diecidue et al. (2004)’s model is similar to Neilson’s with
the additional restriction that only two utility functions are used, one for certain
payments and one for uncertain payments, regardless of their cardinality. Cumula-
tive prospect theory allows for individuals to distort probabilities and value prizes
depending on their rank. This means that in the Marshack-Machina triangle repre-
senting the lotteries in our experiments, indifference curves can be convex (with a
concave probability weighting function) or concave (with a convex probability weight-
ing function).
Table 3 shows the predicted frequency of patterns of behavior if children chose
at random and the observed frequency of such patterns in the data for the six theo-
ries we consider. The first row shows that a child choosing at random would satisfy
betweenness 25 percent of the time while behavior consistent with betweenness oc-
curred 38.6 percent of the time in the on-the-border design and 38.9 percent in the
off-the-border design. The z-scores testing differences in means corresponding to
these comparisons are 7.98 and 8.05 and show that behavior in the experiment is
significantly different from random choice when we assume preferences satisfy be-
tweenness.21 Indeed, for five of the six theories we examine, the patterns of choices
made by children are significantly different from what random decision-making would
predict. The only exception is cumulative prospect theory with a concave weighting
function.
Additional statistical tests confirm that children’s choices are not just noise. The
scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) is a measure of internal consistency or
how related are a set of items in a group (similar to a correlation). This coefficient
for the choices in the five lotteries is 0.31 – it would be about 0.08 if the data were
generated at random. Similarly, the largest eigenvalue corresponding to the five
decisions using factor analysis is 0.508, while the largest eigenvalue, if the data were




n is the sample size.
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generated at random, would be 0.076 (Horn, 1965).
3.3. Consistency with alternative behavioral theories and individual characteristics
Next, we examine whether individual characteristics are correlated with the pre-
dicted patterns of behavior for each theory. This is examined in Table 4 which
presents a linear probability model of a variable that equals 1 if a child’s choice
pattern is consistent with a pattern predicted by a particular theory and equals 0
otherwise on individual characteristics.22 For instance, column 7 in Table 4 presents
the linear probability model corresponding to expected utility theory. For expected
utility theory, the dependent variable equals 1 if a child always chose S or always
R, yielding a choice pattern of SSSSS or RRRRR. For the other columns, the
dependent variable equals 1 if the choice pattern is one of those listed in Table A1
in the Appendix and 0 otherwise. In the first column of Table 4, we show an Ordi-
nary Least Squares regression using the number of safe choices made across the five
lotteries as the dependent variable. This is a measure of the individual level of risk
aversion. All the estimations include fixed-effects at the classroom level to account
for unobserved heterogeneity.
The first column in Table 4 shows that younger children within the cohort and
children who perform better in standardized reading tests are more likely to choose
safe options.23 Columns 2-7 look at consistency with predicted patterns of behavior
for each theory and show that older children within the cohort tend to be less likely
to choose consistently, but this is not significant for all theories considered. Children
whose father’s highest level of education is high school are less likely to act rationally,
but again, this is not robust.
We also examine an alternative measure of rationality: the number of decisions
that need to be changed to make a choice pattern consistent with a particular be-
havioral theory. For instance, an individual choosing a pattern predicted by theory
will have a cost of zero while an individual who would conform to theory by changing
at most one decision will have a cost of one. In general, we find that this alterna-
22The fraction of children whose choices are consistent with each theory is listed in the bottom
of the table. Estimates using a logit specification with fixed effects at the classroom level produce
qualitatively similar results.
23Note that the effect of age in any of our results is not due to older children (e.g. those > 14
years old) who may have been held back and are repeating 8th grade. The effect is solely due to
natural age variation within a grade cohort. A potential reason for age effects is hormonal changes,
however, we do not have a direct way to test this hypothesis.
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tive measure reproduces the same results as Table 4, but the correlation between
individual characteristics and costs to rationality is even weaker.24
So, while some individual characteristics are correlated with making rational de-
cisions, no consistent relationships exist across the various theories we consider.
3.4. Estimation of risk preferences
Thus far, we have seen that the decisions of children are noisy but not random
and individual characteristics are not strong predictors of consistency with theory.
Ultimately, we would like to see how risk preferences and rationality correlate with
field behavior, however, to do so, we need to take into account possible noise in
decision-making. In this section, we introduce a structural approach to estimate risk
preferences that accounts for error in decision-making. In the following section, we
present the estimates that are used with individual choice data to construct a new
risk measure that we correlate with field behavior.
The number of patterns of behavior predicted by the theories we consider ranges
from two to thirteen. To put the various models on the same footing, we use the
approach of Harless and Camerer (1994). They model the observed patterns of
behavior as the result of adherence to a theory with probability (1 − ω) or random
choice with probability ω. For instance, suppose pattern SSSSS is chosen with
probability p and pattern RRRRR is chosen with probability 1− p, then if a person
makes a mistake with probability ω then the probability of observing pattern SSSSS
according to this theory of behavior is p(1− ω)5 + (1− p)ω5. That is, SSSSS could
have been chosen without making errors or because a person switched from the
desired pattern RRRRR by making a mistake.
Since for a given p and ω this approach allows us to calculate the likelihood
of observing any pattern of behavior, we can use maximum likelihood methods to
estimate the parameters of this model or any theory that predicts a subset of all
possible patterns. The number of parameters of a theory so defined is then equal to
the number of patterns of behavior predicted by the theory.25 Note that this approach
treats all mistakes as equal regardless of the absolute difference in the expected value
24Table A5 in Appendix A shows these results. In addition, Table A3 shows that, for the case
of expected utility, the propensity to deviate from rational behavior is correlated with age, father’s
education and math scores.
25Because probabilities add up to one, there are the number of patterns minus one parameter.
The noise parameter adds one more, which makes the total number of parameters equal to the
number of patterns.
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of the lotteries considered. This should not be an issue in our case, however, because
we do not find evidence that children are less likely to make mistakes the larger the
difference in the expected value of the lotteries.26 Table A2 in the Appendix presents
estimates for the theories we consider. All theories have large levels of error, and
these error rates are on the higher side of those reported for adults in Harless and
Camerer (1994).
Comparison of the six models shows that expected utility does just as well at
explaining the data as any of the alternative theories we consider. This is confirmed
with a Vuong (1989) test for model selection and is consistent with results from
experiments with adults (Harless and Camerer, 1994).27 Thus, we use the estimates
from an expected utility model to construct our new measure of risk preferences
which we correlate with field behavior.
An alternative approach to the one described above is the framework of random
utility theory. For instance, we could assume that children either choose according
to a constant absolute risk aversion utility function with some probability or choose
completely at random otherwise. Our approach uses the data more thoroughly.
Estimates are based on the population data and the individual decisions of a child
and provide a more precise measure of individual preferences.28 The random utility
model would allow for this if we assume that individual preferences are characterized
by a distribution rather than a singleton. Our data, however, are not rich enough to
satisfy this assumption.29 Instead, the approach outlined above addresses the issue
26We test if decision errors are sorted according to the difference in expected value between
lotteries by allowing decision errors to decrease with the difference in expected value between
lotteries. We cannot reject the hypothesis that errors are not sorted in this manner (χ2(1) = 1.13,
p-value = 0.2881). The test restricts decision errors to be the same across all participants, but
allows the propensity to choose risk aversely to depend on covariates.
27We conduct pairwise comparisons of all six theories using Vuong (1989)’s test. This is similar
to the AIC test for model selection, but it allows for non-nested models. We use this test because
the patterns of behavior predicted by these models are not always nested. Except for betweenness,
expected utility never does worse than any other model. Statistical comparison of these models are
available from the authors upon request.
28That is, our approach allows an estimation of the conditional probability an individual has
risk averse preferences given his specific choices in the experiment and not just on his individual
characteristics. This approach assumes the existence of idiosyncratic differences in preferences and
uses individual decisions to best guess what these are.
29Such an approach is proposed by von Gaudecker et al. (2011) and ours is a discrete version
of it. von Gaudecker et al. (2011) assume that individuals either evaluate lotteries according to
a parametrically specified expected utility function or choose at random. To model heterogeneity
across individuals, and in the spirit of mixed logit models, they characterize preference parameters
as drawn from a continuous parametric distribution function. For any given set of parameters, an
estimate of an individual’s expected utility parameters can be constructed based on observed choices
and the individual’s characteristics. We have attempted this approach in our data but could not
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of idiosyncratic heterogeneity in preferences, independent of covariates, subject to
the data generated by our experimental design.
3.5. Rationality, risk attitudes and field behavior
3.5.1. Disciplinary referrals
We now turn to the relationship between risk attitudes, rationality and field
behavior. We start with disciplinary referrals as these are acts that have been shown
to predict economic outcomes later in life, such as education achievement and lower
wages (Bowles et al., 2001; Heckman et al., 2006; Lang and Ruud, 1986; Segal, 2013),
as well as high school drop-out rates (Alexander et al., 1997; Rumberger, 1995).
Disciplinary referrals are therefore a good benchmark to evaluate the influence of
preferences on behavior and to test the ability of experiments to uncover them.30
Following Freeman (1999), we expect disciplinary referrals to be negatively correlated
with risk aversion.
Tables 5-7 present negative binomial regressions of disciplinary referrals on three
different measures of risk preferences. All regressions include a measure of rationality
as defined by expected utility theory and covariates. We use a negative binomial
specification because disciplinary referrals are a count variable and many children
have no referrals (see Figure 4 for the distribution of referrals across 7th, 8th and 9th
grades). Our control for rationality is a dummy variable indicating choices consistent
with expected utility because, as shown in Section 3.4, it is as good at explaining the
data as other theories and has been used frequently in the literature. All reported
results in this section hold using any of the alternative theories to define rationality.31
The regressions include fixed effects at the classroom level to account for any variation
due to experimental implementation or selection of students into classrooms.
We look at disciplinary referrals at the end of the 8th grade, 9th grade and the
sum of the two. Eighth grade referrals occurred in middle school, and 9th grade
obtain estimates of the model either using a constant relative risk aversion or a constant absolute
risk aversion utility function. This suggests that our experimental design is not rich enough to
estimate underlying preferences using this approach.
30Time preference may also be important, however, we do not have a measure of this for all
children to include in the regressions. There is a small overlap of students (n=218) who participated
in the time preference experiments reported in Castillo et al. (2011) and the risk experiments
reported in this paper during the 2008-2009 school year. Using this subsample, we rerun the
regressions reported in Table 7 and find similar results. When we add time preferences to the
specifications in Table 7, the coefficient on the posterior risk measure is reduced (by 8-12%) and
remains significant for 8th grade referrals. The coefficient on time preferences, however, is not
significant. With this small subsample, we are likely underpower to detect significant effects.
31These results are reported in Tables A6-A14 in Appendix A.
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referrals occurred in high school. Having referrals for the same child from two dif-
ferent schools provides two separate, independent measures of misbehavior. This
allows for a stress test on our results because these are two different sets of school
administrators deciding whether to record the discipline infraction on the student’s
permanent record. These referrals occurred up to 2 years after the experiments were
conducted. All the regressions also control for disciplinary referrals in the 7th grade.
While our results are qualitatively similar whether this variable is included or not,
including past misbehavior diminishes the omitted variable problem due to unob-
servable conditions that might influence an individual’s behavior in the field and in
the experiment.
We examine whether our first risk preference measure, a simple aggregate of
the total number of safe choices across the five decisions, can explain disciplinary
referrals. Table 5 shows these results for referrals in 8th, 9th and 8th and 9th grades
combined.32
Consistent with previous research on the behavior of children (Bertrand and Pan,
2013), we find that male and black children are more likely to have disciplinary re-
ferrals.33 Children who qualify for free or reduced price school meals are also more
likely to have disciplinary referrals. The opposite is true for children living in a two-
parent household, first-born children, an only child in the household, and children
who perform better on standardized math tests, although some of these results are
not robust across years. Past disciplinary referrals are a strong predictor of future
disciplinary referrals. This is consistent with disciplinary referrals being the product
of unobserved personality traits, conditions faced by the child or expectations.34 In
the absence of additional individual information on these factors, we cannot distin-
guish between these hypotheses.
Looking at the effect of risk preferences on referrals, columns 1-3 in Table 5 show
that, using our first measure of risk, the more safe choices a child makes, the fewer
disciplinary referrals she receives. However, this is only significant when 8th and 9th
32Tables A6-A8 in Appendix A show the same results for all six of the theories we consider and
confirm our main results are robust to our use of expected utility to define rationality.
33In our data, boys have 2.59 disciplinary referrals and girls have 1.51 disciplinary referrals (p-
value < 0.000). Black children have 2.99 disciplinary referrals on average and non-black children
have 1.32 disciplinary referrals (p-value < 0.000).
34The school system follows a progressive discipline policy so that after one referral the conse-
quences of the next become greater. After one referral the administrator may not have the option to
not record a second referral whereas until one referral is entered the administrator has the discretion
to not enter referrals.
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grade referrals are combined (column 3).35 Table 6 reports the effect of our second
risk preference measure on referrals. This measure looks at each decision separately
and equals one if the riskier option was chosen. Only one of the decisions, D1, is
significantly correlated with referrals and only in 8th grade and 8th and 9th grades
combined. The results from Tables 5 and 6 show that our first two measures of risk
preferences are not significantly correlated with disciplinary referrals.
For our third measure of risk preferences, we construct a new measure that ac-
counts for decision error. Using the results and approach outlined in the previous
section, we estimate a structural model that predicts that a person adheres to ex-
pected utility with probability 1− ω and reverses her preferences (makes a mistake)
with probability ω. Recall that, in our experiment, expected utility permits only
two choice patterns (SSSSS or RRRRR, i.e. all safe or all risky). We allow the
probability p of choosing SSSSS and the probability of making a mistake (ω) to
depend on the characteristics of the individual. Using the entire sample, we then
estimate these parameters and use them to calculate a posterior probability that a
person chooses all safe options. e.g. SSSSS.36
We illustrate how the posterior probability is determined with an example. Sup-
pose we want to know the probability that a child of characteristics x, absent making
decision mistakes, would have chosen pattern SSSSS instead of the observed pat-
tern SSRRR. Suppose also that the structural estimate of the probability a child
choose pattern SSSSS is Pr(SSSSS|x) = pS(x) and the structural estimates of the
probability of making a decision error is e(x). We can calculate the posterior prob-
ability that a child choosing SSRRR has preferences SSSSS using Bayes rule as
Pr(SSSSS|SSRRR, x) = pS(x)(1−e(x))
3e(x)2
pS(x)(1−e(x))3e(x)2+(1−pS(x))(1−e(x))2e(x)3
. We use this formula
to produce the estimate of an individual’s preferences given the model estimates and
their actual choices. We refer to this new measure of risk attitudes that corrects for
measurement error as Pr(AAAAA|Choice) in the regression table.
Table 7 shows the results of using this third measure. Now, we see that future
disciplinary referrals are significantly and negatively correlated with risk aversion,
35Consistent with the importance of taking into account decision complexity and error, the effect
of risk preferences using the off-border design is less precisely measured than using the on-border
design.
36The results of these estimations are shown in Table A3 in Appendix A and are largely consistent
with previous research. For example, boys are less likely to choose all safe options, but this is not
significant. Those with higher math scores are less likely to choose all safe and have lower error
rates. The off-border design (partially proxied by the dummy variable ”Experiment run in 2011”)
yields higher error rates.
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even controlling for demographics, household characteristics and rationality. Chil-
dren who are more risk averse are less likely to receive disciplinary referrals up to two
years in the future. The effect is large, consistent with theory and holds in both 8th
and 9th grades, when the child is in the last year of middle school and the first year
of high school. The average difference in the likelihood of being risk averse between
those who chose always S and those who chose always R is 0.5. This implies that the
effect of risk preferences on disciplinary referrals in 9th grade (0.5×-0.65 = -0.325)
is half the effect of being black and almost three times the effect of being a boy.
For the sum of referrals in 8th and 9th grades, the effect of choosing always safe
options versus risky is the same as the effect of being a boy or three quarters the
effect of being black. Rationality, however, does not explain referrals.37 Finally, the
negative and significant effect of risk aversion on misbehavior is robust to alternative
specifications.38
This third measure of risk aversion is an estimate and therefore is likely to be
affected by sampling error. Table A4 in Appendix A presents the distribution of
the estimated effect of risk aversion on disciplinary referrals in the 8th grade, 9th
grade and 8th and 9th grades combined based on 1,000 bootstrap replications of
the estimates. While sampling error is important, our estimates remain robust. The
effect of risk aversion is still significantly negatively correlated with future disciplinary
referrals in 9th grade and 8th and 9th grades combined.
The results in this section show that repeated measures of risk preferences are
advantageous as they allow us to construct estimates that correct for measurement er-
ror. Without taking into account decision error, we would have concluded that there
is no significant relationship between preferences and disciplinary referrals. With
37Results using alternative definitions of rationality can be seen in Tables A12-A14 in Appendix A.
These results show that, with the exception of Diecidue et al. (2004), none of the theories of decision
making under uncertainty explain misbehavior. It is interesting to note that Diecidue et al. (2004)
allow for certainty baises (people value certain payoff more than uncertain ones) and uncertainty
biases (people value uncertain payoff more than certain ones). It is the presence of uncertainty
biased children that explains the positive correlation between rationality and disciplinary referrals.
These confirm that whether risk attitudes are measured by the concavity of the utility function or
through a distortion of expected utility, it is the propensity to take risky actions that is correlated
with disciplinary referrals.
38If instead of the number of disciplinary referrals, we use as the dependent variable a binary
variable that equals 1 if the child has had any disciplinary referrals > 0 and equals 0 if the child
has had no referrals and rerun all the specifications in Table 8, we get similar results. Risk averse
children have a lower probability of having at least one disciplinary referral. The effect is roughly
11 percent in 8th grade and 16 percent in 9th grade and 8th and 9th grades combined. The effect
is significant at the 5-percent level for 9th grade and 8th and 9th grades combined and at the
15-percent level for 8th grade.
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our constructed measure of risk preferences, however, we are able to uncover that
children who are more risk averse are significantly less likely to receive disciplinary
referrals two years in the future.
3.5.2. High School completion
We now consider the relationship between risk attitudes and high school comple-
tion. The current definition for an on-time graduation by the state of Georgia (see
www.gadoe.gov) is completing all high school requirements in four years, and this
is commonly used in the education literature (Murnane, 2013). The school district
provided us with high school graduation status data, however, there is missing in-
formation for about 27 percent of the children. These children transferred to other
schools outside the district or dropped out of the system.39 So, we cannot determine
with certainty if they finished high school in four years or not.
To address this, we build on Eckstein and Wolpin (1999)’s approach to studying
the dynamics of educational attainment through credits earned in each year of high
school. We construct an outcome variable that equals one if the child finished or
was on track to finish high school in four years at the date of the last administrative
record. It is coded as zero otherwise. The variable is constructed using the cumulative
number of credits earned because this reveals the child’s progress towards an on-
time.40 The advantage of this approach is that the data on credits earned are available
for all children even if graduation status is not.
To evaluate if our “on-track” measure provides a reliable proxy for finishing high
school on time, we perform a placebo test of the measure on the sub-sample of
children for whom we have graduation status. In particular, we calculate the “on-
track” variable based on data at the end of the 9th, 10th and 11th grade and compare
it with the observed high school outcome (i.e. graduate on time or not). We find
that our on-track proxy and the actual graduation status are highly and significantly
correlated (correlations are 0.746 using 9th grade data, 0.806 using 10th grade data
39Of the children who participated in the experiment, 64.0% are confirmed to have graduated in
four years, 9.6% are confirmed to have “dropped out” (e.g. due to being expelled, lack of attendance,
still enrolled in high school, incarcerated, low grades/school failure), and the remaining 26.5% have
an uncertain graduation status. Of those who graduated, 2.8% obtained high school graduation in
an Academy. Academies are private high schools that accept students who cannot pass the tests
required by public schools to graduate.
40For children with a confirmed graduation status record, the on-track variable is coded as one if
the child graduated in no more than four years. A child needs to earn at least 5 credits to complete
9th grade, 11 credits to complete 10th grade, 17 credits to complete 11th grade and 23 credits to
complete 12th grade.
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and 0.800 using 11th grade data). With this proxy measure, 74.8% of children are
classified as being on track to graduate on time. This is comparable with the state
level graduation rate of 71%.
Table 8 shows the relationship between risk preferences, other covariates and
being on track to graduate high school. All the regressions include dummy variables
‘SAFEi’ that equal 1 if the number of safe decisions is ‘i’ and 0 otherwise. The
omitted category is choosing always risky. The regressions also include indicators
of academic performance in the 8th grade, household background variables and the
number of disciplinary referrals in 7th grade as a control of past behavioral problems.
We report probit regressions with classroom random effects and logit regressions
with classroom fixed effects for the entire sample and the subsample for whom grad-
uation status is known. Table 8 shows that a child who makes safe choices in the
experiment is more likely to complete high school, and this relationship appears to be
nonlinear. This holds in the entire sample, the subsample of children with confirmed
graduation status and when we use a stricter measure of high school completion (e.g.
academy graduates are counted as not completing high school).41
To assess the magnitude of the effect of risk attitudes on high school completion,
Table 9 reports regressions with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the number of
risky decisions is 5 and 0 otherwise. The size of the effect is large. Column 1 of
Table 9 shows that the coefficient is -0.610 while the coefficient on the standardized
math test is 0.023. Given that the standard deviation of the standardized math test
is 32.3, we conclude that always choosing the risky alternatives is close in magnitude
to a one standard deviation change in math scores.
In the previous section, we showed that accounting for measurement and decision
error in analyzing the relationship between risk preferences and disciplinary refer-
rals is crucial. Table 10 shows that the same is true for high school completion.
To capture the nonlinearity of the relationship between high school completion and
risk preferences we estimate the coefficients of a polynomial of degree three on the
posterior probability of choosing all safe decisions.42 Table 10 confirms that naive
41The finding that risk averse children are less likely to misbehave (e.g. receive disciplinary
referrals) and more likely to complete high school is consistent with findings from labor economics
that adolescence misbehavior has adverse effects on adult earnings (Heckman et al., 2006; Segal,
2013). Our results control for academic ability with standardized test scores and cannot speak to
the effect of IQ on these field outcomes (Dohmen et al., 2010)
42This nonlinear effect is illustrated in Figure A1 which graphs the estimates for different hy-
pothetical values of the posterior compared to the effect of different proportions of safe decisions.
Estimates are based on column 1 of Tables 8 and 10.
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measures might underestimate the importance of individual preferences on field be-
havior and provides evidence of the robustness of our results. This is consistent with
the effect size of risk attitudes on high school completion of being similar to that of
academic performance.
3.5.3. Robustness checks
We investigate whether a more standard, and perhaps simpler, approach to mea-
surement error produces similar results to those provided in the previous sections. To
do this, we recast the problem of measuring individual preference as one of measuring
a linear latent factor model for which we have five measures.
Suppose child i is an expected utility maximizer with utilities for lottery out-
comes H,M and L equal to Hi,Mi and 0. It can be shown that, in our on-border
design, a child chooses the risk lottery if 0.8Hi−Mi ≥ 0. Similarly, in our off-border
design, a child chooses the risk lottery if 0.6(0.8Hi −Mi) ≥ 0. Let fi denote the
amount 0.8Hi −Mi and let εj be a random component of utility. Then a child will
choose the risky decision in lottery k if λkfi + εk ≥ 0 in the on-border lotteries and
0.6λkfi+εk ≥ 0 in the off-border lotteries. The parameter λk captures all the factors
that make the decision in a particular lottery more or less salient. Under the assump-
tion that random utility terms are independent across lotteries (Cov(εk, εl) = 0), this
is equivalent to a linear latent factor model, where the latent factor is the difference in
utility 0.8Hi−Mi. The model can be estimated without making assumptions on the
parametric form of the utility function, and some features of preferences (0.8Hi−Mi)
are identified while others will not be (e.g. the coefficient of relative risk aversion).
Our off-border design is expected to produce noisier measures of individual prefer-
ences. Estimates of the latent factor fi therefore provide an alternative approach to
measure decision error.
Tables A15 and A16 in the Appendix show the coefficient estimates on disciplinary
referrals and high school graduation using estimates of latent factor fi instead of the
posterior probability of choosing all safe decisions.43 To put the factor model on
equal footing with our proposed approach, we estimate it under the assumption that
lottery decisions depend on individual characteristics as well. We find that estimates
of the latent factor using maximum likelihood methods is significantly correlated
with our posterior estimates (ρ = −0.596, p−value < 0.0001). However, Tables A15
43The parameters of the factor model are also non-parametrically identified if variables are con-
tinuous rather than discrete. The estimates using this nonparametric approach, albeit technically
incorrect, provide similar results to those based on maximum likelihood estimates.
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and A16 show that this latent factor is not predictive of either future disciplinary
referrals or high school graduation. Since the main difference between this model and
the one proposed in the previous section is that inconsistencies are not due to small
variations in utility but to the tendency to choose at random, we conclude that how
the underlying motivations of children are modeled is crucial in obtaining precisely
measured results. This robustness check lends additional support to our preferred
approach.
4. Conclusions
We set out to investigate the relationship between children’s rationality, risk
preferences and field behavior. Our study is motivated by economic theory which
suggests that misbehavior and educational outcomes are, ceteris paribus, correlated
with the willingness to take risks. Our main finding is that children who are more
risk averse are less likely to receive disciplinary referrals up to two years after the
experiment and are more likely to complete high school five years later. Risk attitudes
not only significantly correlate with behavior in the field but also with behavior in the
future. More importantly, our estimates show that risk preferences have an effect
on behavior separate from rationality, cognitive abilities, household environment
and past behavior. Overall, we find that the size of the effect of risk attitudes on
field behavior is as large as a one standard deviation change in standardized math
scores. Risk preferences are therefore important for understanding the heterogeneity
of children’s field behavior and could interact with how children respond to policy.
We directly test the rationality of children in risky environments under alternative
models of behavior. Our data suggest that children are not always rational, as
defined by various theories, but their choices are not random either. Appropriately
addressing measurement problems may be important in other contexts as well.
Our paper also contributes to the discussion on the external validity of experimen-
tal measures of preferences by showing that the relationship between experimental
data and field behavior may be obscured by measurement error. In our data, simple
aggregate measures of risk preferences do not correlate strongly with future field be-
havior, but an estimate of risk preferences that corrects for measurement error does.
In addition, by controlling for past field behavior, we examine the correlation of risk
preferences with important educational outcomes separately from the child’s history.
If preferences largely determine responses to incentives, policies designed to foster
investment in human capital among children are likely to have heterogeneous effects
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in the population. In the extreme, if those more likely to take risks are also less likely
to take advantage of these type of incentives, rewards for good behavior might just
be a transfer to children that would have invested optimally in the absence of the
incentive. Optimal policies might ultimately require differential treatment across
individuals. Our results certainly suggest that designs of incentives for children
to accumulate human and non-human capital may need to take into consideration
heterogeneity of preferences and the desire of some children to take risks.
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On-Border design Off-Border design
Figure 1: Experimental design represented in the Marschak-Machina
triangle
The thicker lines connect the two lottery options available for each of the five decisions (D1, D2, D3, D4, D5).
Solid dots represent options for the on-border design, and open dots are for the off-border design. The dot located
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Figure 2. Decisions in the on-border design as represented to subjects
For each of the five decisions (D1, D2, D3, D4, D5), subjects chose either A or B . A is the safer option (S) and
B is the riskier option (R). For each option, payoffs are associated with numbers, from 1-20. These represent the
probability of receiving that payment. Payment is determined by choosing one numbered ball (numbered from 1-20)
from a bingo cage.
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Figure 3. Decisions in the off-border design as represented to subjects
For each of the five decisions (D1, D2, D3, D4, D5), subjects chose either A or B . A is the safer option (S) and
B is the riskier option (R). For each option, payoffs are associated with numbers, from 1-100. These represent
the probability of receiving that payment. Payment is determined by choosing one numbered ball (numbered from
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Figure 4. Distribution of Disciplinary referrals
For 7th, 8th, 9th and 8th/9th grades.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
% or Mean s.d. N
Total 1,275
Male (%) 50.82 648
Black (%) 44.16 563
White (%) 48.16 614
Age in years 13.78 0.64
Two-parent household (%) 66.00
Mother finished high school (no college) (%) 39.02
Father finished high school (no college) (%) 35.35
Mother has college degree (%) 32.56
Father has college degree (%) 23.26
First born (%) 37.80
No older sibling in household (%) 48.63
Math score (8th grade) 812.51 32.31
Reading score (8th grade) 831.27 23.00
Free and reduced price lunch (%) 64.84
# of Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 1.56 3.92
# of Disciplinary referrals (8th grade) 2.06 3.55
# of Disciplinary referrals (9th grade) 1.33 3.00
Graduated high school (%) 73.0
Some children are missing data on age, test scores (because they left the school system between the ex-
periment and testing), household characteristics (because they failed to answer a post-experiment survey
question) or graduation status (because they left the school system prior to 12th grade).
Table 2. Distribution of lottery decisions
(percent in parentheses)
On-border lotteries Off-border lotteries
Safe Risky Safe Risky
D1 447 (68.98) 201 (31.02) 379 (60.45) 248 (39.55)
D2 384 (59.26) 264 (40.74) 420 (66.99) 207 (33.01)
D3 411 (63.43) 237 (36.57) 410 (65.39) 217 (34.61)
D4 394 (60.80) 254 (39.20) 374 (59.65) 253 (40.35)
D5 332 (51.23) 316 (48.77) 289 (46.09) 338 (53.91)
Total 1,968 (60.74) 1,272 (39.26) 1,872 (59.71) 1,263 (40.29)
Test of equality of distributions: χ2(31) = 65.7085, p-value = 0.000
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Table 3. Observed behavior versus random behavior (in percent)
On-the-border design Off-the-border design
Theory (# of patterns) Observed Random z-score Observed Random z-score
Betweenness (8) 38.58 25.00 7.98 38.92 25.00 8.05
Neilson (1992) (5;2) 26.70 15.63 7.76 13.56 6.25 7.56
Diecidue et al. (2004) (6;2) 27.62 18.75 5.79 13.56 6.25 7.56
CPT w/convex weights (13) 61.42 40.63 10.78 52.47 40.63 12.48
CPT w/concave weights (13) 40.43 40.63 -0.10 44.50 40.63 1.97
Expected utility (2) 16.51 6.25 10.79 13.56 6.25 7.56
If the number of predicted patterns differ in the on-border and off-border designs, they are listed as (x;y). The z-score is
the test statistic comparing observed to random behavior for the on-border or off-border designs.
35
Table 4. Linear probability model of rationality as defined by various theories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of Betweenness Neilson Preference CPT CPT Expected
Variables safe decisions (1992) for certainty convex w. concave w. utility
Male -0.112 -0.009 -0.038 0.007 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
[0.077] [0.031] [0.031] [0.025] [0.025] [0.031] [0.022]
Black -0.040 -0.061* -0.058 -0.012 -0.026 0.031 -0.025
[0.090] [0.036] [0.036] [0.029] [0.029] [0.036] [0.026]
Age in years -0.230*** -0.041 -0.023 -0.048* -0.056** -0.032 -0.057**
[0.078] [0.031] [0.031] [0.025] [0.025] [0.031] [0.022]
Two-parent household 0.043 -0.045 -0.007 -0.013 -0.021 0.001 -0.012
[0.088] [0.035] [0.035] [0.028] [0.028] [0.035] [0.025]
Mother’s highest education 0.043 0.008 0.073* 0.031 -0.003 0.077* 0.023
is high school [0.105] [0.042] [0.042] [0.034] [0.034] [0.043] [0.030]
Father’s highest education -0.042 -0.045 -0.073* -0.062** -0.054* -0.056 -0.064**
is high school [0.098] [0.039] [0.039] [0.031] [0.031] [0.040] [0.028]
Mother’s highest education -0.021 0.036 0.091* 0.009 -0.023 0.051 0.011
is college [0.118] [0.047] [0.047] [0.037] [0.038] [0.048] [0.034]
Father’s highest education 0.150 -0.020 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.024 -0.025
is college [0.116] [0.046] [0.046] [0.037] [0.037] [0.047] [0.033]
First born -0.029 0.035 0.040 0.042 0.031 -0.009 0.028
[0.092] [0.037] [0.037] [0.029] [0.030] [0.037] [0.026]
Only child in household 0.052 -0.046 -0.011 -0.016 -0.012 0.047 -0.007
[0.091] [0.036] [0.036] [0.029] [0.029] [0.037] [0.026]
Math score (8th grade) -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Reading score (8th grade) 0.005** 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Free & reduced price meal 0.025 -0.043 0.024 -0.056* -0.041 0.018 -0.037
[0.096] [0.038] [0.038] [0.031] [0.031] [0.039] [0.028]
Constant 2.703 -0.761 0.175 0.332 0.349 1.328 -0.017
[2.335] [0.932] [0.932] [0.743] [0.750] [0.943] [0.672]
Fraction consistent w/theory 0.38 0.19 0.20 0.42 0.57 0.15
Observations 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065
R-squared 0.024 0.021 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.009 0.024
Number of classrooms 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Dependent variable in columns 2-7 equals 1 if the observed decision pattern is predicted by the theory. Fixed effects at the classroom level.
Robust standard errors in brackets. Off-border design is controlled for with classroom fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 5. Fixed effects negative binomial regression on number of disciplinary referrals
using number of safe decisions as risk measure
(1) (2) (3)
8th grade 9th grade 8th & 9th grade
Number of safe decisions -0.050 -0.067 -0.057*
[0.034] [0.044] [0.032]
Consistent with EU 0.146 0.238 0.161
[0.124] [0.158] [0.117]
Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.055***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.004]
Male 0.449*** 0.143 0.288***
[0.079] [0.101] [0.074]
Black 0.259*** 0.586*** 0.355***
[0.093] [0.121] [0.088]
Age (years) -0.134* -0.085 -0.134*
[0.077] [0.099] [0.073]
Two-parent household -0.193** 0.022 -0.146*
[0.084] [0.110] [0.080]
Mother’s highest education -0.041 0.007 -0.015
is high school [0.103] [0.132] [0.097]
Father’s highest education -0.048 -0.112 -0.074
is high school [0.098] [0.126] [0.093]
Mother’s highest education 0.026 0.079 0.023
is college [0.119] [0.153] [0.113]
Father’s highest education -0.211* -0.267* -0.158
is college [0.123] [0.160] [0.115]
First born -0.210** -0.230* -0.217**
[0.097] [0.123] [0.090]
Only child in household -0.174* -0.046 -0.132
[0.093] [0.119] [0.087]
Math score (8th grade) -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Free & reduced price meal 0.277*** 0.328** 0.261***
[0.106] [0.139] [0.099]
Constant 11.599*** 10.462*** 12.144***
[2.504] [3.191] [2.338]
Observations 1,060 1,055 1,060
Number of classrooms 62 60 62
Log-Likelihood -1453 -1145 -1833
Fixed effects at the classroom level. Robust standard errors in brackets. Off-border design is con-
trolled for with classroom fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 6. Fixed effects negative binomial regression on number of
disciplinary referrals using each individual decision separately as risk
measure. Numbers in table are coefficients on each decision.
(1) (2) (3)
8th grade 9th grade 8th & 9th grade
Risk taking in D1 0.156* 0.082 0.133*
[0.083] [0.108] [0.079]
Risk taking in D2 0.018 0.132 0.044
[0.083] [0.107] [0.079]
Risk taking in D3 0.030 0.013 0.040
[0.084] [0.109] [0.079]
Risk taking in D4 0.098 0.144 0.120
[0.081] [0.105] [0.077]
Risk taking in D5 -0.017 0.010 -0.017
[0.084] [0.109] [0.079]
Covariates inlcuded? yes yes yes
Observations 1,060 1,055 1,060
Number of classrooms 62 60 62
Full regression results are reported in Tables A9-A11 in Appendix A. Fixed effects at the
classroom level. Robust standard errors in brackets. Off-border design is controlled for with
classroom fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 7. Fixed effects negative binomial regression on disciplinary referrals using esti-
mated risk measure
(1) (2) (3)
8th grade 9th grade 8th & 9th grade
Pr(AAAAA|Choice)+ -0.464** -0.651** -0.584***
[0.231] [0.299] [0.213]
Consistent with EU 0.098 0.172 0.104
[0.118] [0.150] [0.111]
Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.056***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.004]
Male 0.439*** 0.128 0.274***
[0.079] [0.102] [0.074]
Black 0.300*** 0.648*** 0.408***
[0.096] [0.125] [0.090]
Age (years) -0.134* -0.080 -0.133*
[0.077] [0.099] [0.073]
Two-parent household -0.194** 0.024 -0.145*
[0.083] [0.109] [0.079]
Mother’s highest education -0.021 0.037 0.009
is high school [0.104] [0.134] [0.097]
Father’s highest education -0.012 -0.064 -0.030
is high school [0.099] [0.128] [0.094]
Mother’s highest education 0.042 0.103 0.042
is college [0.119] [0.154] [0.113]
Father’s highest education -0.194 -0.242 -0.135
is college [0.124] [0.161] [0.116]
First born -0.257** -0.290** -0.273***
[0.100] [0.127] [0.093]
Only child in household -0.152 -0.023 -0.106
[0.093] [0.120] [0.087]
Math score (8th grade) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Free & reduced price meal 0.281*** 0.335** 0.264***
[0.106] [0.139] [0.099]
Constant 12.199*** 11.023*** 12.809***
[2.510] [3.194] [2.342]
Observations 1,060 1,055 1,060
Number of classrooms 62 60 62
Log-Likelihood -1452 -1143 -1831
+Pr(Observed choice) = Pr(Observed choice|α, ε)α + Pr(Observed choice|1 − α, ε)(1 − α), α =
Pr(AAAAA). Pr(AAAAA|Observed choice) = Pr(ObservedChoice|α,ε)α
Pr(ObservedChoice)
.
Fixed effects at the classroom level. Robust standard errors in brackets. Off-border design is con-
trolled for with classroom fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 8. Effect of number of safe decisions on completing high school
Academy graduates included Academy graduates counted as dropouts
Probit Logit Probit Logit
Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects
VARIABLES All Known All Known All Known All Known
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 Safe decision 0.769** 1.019** 1.517** 2.049** 0.499 0.630 1.088* 1.452*
[0.373] [0.441] [0.671] [0.848] [0.366] [0.420] [0.646] [0.775]
2 Safe decisions 0.712** 0.986** 1.394** 2.064** 0.573* 0.783* 1.122* 1.635**
[0.344] [0.410] [0.627] [0.804] [0.342] [0.400] [0.609] [0.740]
3 Safe decisions 0.574* 0.836** 1.169* 1.807** 0.406 0.566 0.877 1.275*
[0.341] [0.405] [0.617] [0.790] [0.339] [0.393] [0.601] [0.727]
4 Safe decisions 0.557 0.831** 1.042* 1.608** 0.508 0.704* 0.965 1.337*
[0.343] [0.409] [0.622] [0.797] [0.342] [0.399] [0.607] [0.739]
5 Safe decisions 0.598* 1.010** 1.228* 2.124** 0.501 0.790* 0.998 1.560**
[0.361] [0.436] [0.660] [0.864] [0.359] [0.423] [0.642] [0.790]
Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) -0.104*** -0.102*** -0.176*** -0.182*** -0.113*** -0.099*** -0.185*** -0.165***
[0.019] [0.023] [0.034] [0.045] [0.019] [0.022] [0.035] [0.041]
Male -0.201* -0.017 -0.334* -0.061 -0.132 0.023 -0.196 0.029
[0.108] [0.138] [0.196] [0.261] [0.105] [0.128] [0.186] [0.236]
Black 0.330*** 0.449*** 0.560** 0.732** 0.264** 0.311** 0.440** 0.510*
[0.124] [0.162] [0.227] [0.318] [0.120] [0.148] [0.215] [0.281]
Age (years) -0.188* -0.426*** -0.333* -0.893*** -0.190** -0.380*** -0.329* -0.733***
[0.099] [0.129] [0.179] [0.246] [0.097] [0.121] [0.173] [0.223]
Two-parent household 0.266** 0.213 0.444** 0.405 0.222** 0.156 0.358* 0.317
[0.116] [0.150] [0.208] [0.287] [0.112] [0.138] [0.199] [0.255]
Mother’s highest education 0.412*** 0.462*** 0.590** 0.737** 0.477*** 0.558*** 0.699*** 0.815***
is high school [0.137] [0.170] [0.247] [0.327] [0.133] [0.159] [0.238] [0.294]
Father’s highest education 0.197 0.260 0.343 0.451 0.106 0.095 0.157 0.139
is high school [0.134] [0.169] [0.245] [0.313] [0.129] [0.154] [0.233] [0.286]
Mother’s highest education 0.267* 0.272 0.362 0.352 0.320** 0.338* 0.446* 0.352
is college [0.155] [0.200] [0.282] [0.387] [0.150] [0.185] [0.270] [0.343]
Father’s highest education 0.128 0.236 0.394 0.525 0.208 0.293 0.525* 0.683*
is college [0.162] [0.221] [0.294] [0.428] [0.159] [0.207] [0.285] [0.390]
First born 0.119 0.183 0.173 0.331 0.137 0.214 0.240 0.438
[0.128] [0.163] [0.230] [0.312] [0.123] [0.150] [0.220] [0.282]
Only child in household 0.131 0.180 0.233 0.360 0.110 0.091 0.192 0.169
[0.124] [0.159] [0.223] [0.302] [0.120] [0.146] [0.214] [0.272]
Math score (8th grade) 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.039*** 0.042***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007]
Reading score (8th grade) 0.006* 0.011** 0.015** 0.028*** 0.005 0.008* 0.011* 0.018**
[0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.010] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008]
Free & reduced price meal -0.203 -0.221 -0.215 -0.340 -0.151 -0.154 -0.131 -0.194
[0.137] [0.183] [0.251] [0.359] [0.131] [0.166] [0.238] [0.313]
Observations 1,016 820 844 613 1,016 820 844 624
Number of classrooms 63 62 52 48 63 62 52 49
log-likelihood -381.1 -237.3 -275.5 -146.1 -411.2 -276.3 -300.6 -181.4
s.e. in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. ”All” includes the entire sample, and ”Known” is the known graduation status subsample.
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Table 9. Effect of choosing “all risky” on completing high school
Academy graduates included Academy graduates counted as dropouts
Probit Logit Probit Logit
Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects
VARIABLES All Known All Known All Known All Known
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Always chose risky -0.598* -1.014** -1.234* -2.156** -0.503 -0.793* -1.006 -1.576**
[0.361] [0.436] [0.662] [0.859] [0.359] [0.422] [0.644] [0.789]
Consistent with EU -0.030 0.116 0.001 0.295 0.012 0.125 0.012 0.164
[0.167] [0.225] [0.308] [0.442] [0.163] [0.208] [0.296] [0.395]
Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) -0.104*** -0.101*** -0.175*** -0.182*** -0.112*** -0.097*** -0.185*** -0.164***
[0.019] [0.023] [0.034] [0.044] [0.019] [0.022] [0.035] [0.041]
Male -0.197* -0.012 -0.323* -0.022 -0.133 0.020 -0.192 0.047
[0.108] [0.138] [0.195] [0.258] [0.104] [0.127] [0.186] [0.234]
Black 0.329*** 0.456*** 0.551** 0.759** 0.266** 0.319** 0.441** 0.538*
[0.124] [0.161] [0.226] [0.317] [0.120] [0.147] [0.214] [0.279]
Age (years) -0.186* -0.422*** -0.327* -0.894*** -0.187* -0.369*** -0.324* -0.718***
[0.099] [0.128] [0.179] [0.246] [0.097] [0.120] [0.173] [0.222]
Two-parent household 0.267** 0.215 0.436** 0.385 0.224** 0.165 0.359* 0.323
[0.115] [0.149] [0.207] [0.281] [0.112] [0.138] [0.198] [0.254]
Mother’s highest education 0.400*** 0.459*** 0.575** 0.746** 0.467*** 0.547*** 0.690*** 0.812***
is high school [0.136] [0.170] [0.246] [0.325] [0.133] [0.159] [0.238] [0.293]
Father’s highest education 0.194 0.259 0.335 0.468 0.096 0.080 0.142 0.128
is high school [0.133] [0.168] [0.243] [0.312] [0.128] [0.154] [0.232] [0.284]
Mother’s highest education 0.256* 0.273 0.337 0.332 0.316** 0.338* 0.439 0.349
is college [0.154] [0.199] [0.280] [0.385] [0.150] [0.184] [0.269] [0.342]
Father’s highest education 0.108 0.220 0.355 0.518 0.201 0.284 0.504* 0.655*
is college [0.161] [0.220] [0.292] [0.426] [0.158] [0.207] [0.283] [0.388]
First born 0.124 0.192 0.176 0.325 0.143 0.220 0.250 0.447
[0.128] [0.163] [0.229] [0.309] [0.123] [0.149] [0.219] [0.281]
Only child in household 0.127 0.170 0.228 0.357 0.108 0.081 0.184 0.149
[0.124] [0.158] [0.221] [0.298] [0.120] [0.145] [0.213] [0.270]
Math score (8th grade) 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.039*** 0.041***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.007]
Reading score (8th grade) 0.006* 0.011** 0.014** 0.028*** 0.005 0.008* 0.011* 0.018**
[0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008]
Free & reduced price meal -0.213 -0.227 -0.234 -0.345 -0.160 -0.170 -0.145 -0.219
[0.136] [0.182] [0.250] [0.355] [0.131] [0.165] [0.237] [0.310]
Observations 1,016 820 844 613 1,016 820 844 624
Number of classrooms 63 62 52 48 63 62 52 49
log-likelihood -382.1 -237.9 -276.8 -146.9 -411.9 -277.2 -301.1 -182.0
s.e. in brackets, p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. ”All” includes the entire sample, and ”Known”
is the known graduation status subsample.
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Table 10. Effect of estimated risk on completing high school
Academy graduates included Academy graduates counted as dropouts
Probit Logit Probit Logit
Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects
VARIABLES All Known All Known All Known All Known
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pr(AAAAA|Choice)+ 6.691* 12.737*** 15.745** 34.422*** 6.552* 11.349*** 15.686** 28.615***
[3.806] [4.749] [7.559] [10.304] [3.637] [4.307] [6.869] [8.915]
Pr(AAAAA|Choice)2,+ -12.958* -25.234*** -29.608** -64.676*** -11.970* -21.701** -28.100** -52.591***
[7.456] [9.492] [14.468] [20.074] [7.153] [8.626] [13.290] [17.457]
Pr(AAAAA|Choice)3,+ 7.018* 13.984** 15.867* 34.527*** 6.322 11.850** 14.714* 27.761***
[4.246] [5.431] [8.118] [11.243] [4.086] [4.956] [7.519] [9.837]
Consistent with EU -0.135 -0.118 -0.244 -0.179 -0.062 -0.033 -0.150 -0.127
[0.170] [0.226] [0.307] [0.430] [0.166] [0.210] [0.296] [0.390]
Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.177*** -0.185*** -0.112*** -0.099*** -0.186*** -0.166***
[0.019] [0.023] [0.034] [0.045] [0.019] [0.022] [0.036] [0.041]
Male -0.193* 0.017 -0.302 0.047 -0.128 0.045 -0.173 0.098
[0.109] [0.141] [0.197] [0.264] [0.106] [0.131] [0.188] [0.239]
Black 0.335*** 0.454*** 0.553** 0.779** 0.260** 0.304** 0.424* 0.534*
[0.127] [0.165] [0.232] [0.319] [0.122] [0.150] [0.220] [0.282]
Age (years) -0.180* -0.418*** -0.317* -0.904*** -0.184* -0.366*** -0.314* -0.729***
[0.100] [0.132] [0.181] [0.250] [0.098] [0.123] [0.176] [0.227]
Two-parent household 0.270** 0.242 0.449** 0.509* 0.227** 0.186 0.373* 0.388
[0.115] [0.150] [0.208] [0.286] [0.112] [0.139] [0.199] [0.257]
Mother’s highest education 0.399*** 0.428** 0.556** 0.633* 0.463*** 0.527*** 0.677*** 0.783***
is high school [0.137] [0.171] [0.248] [0.328] [0.134] [0.160] [0.240] [0.298]
Father’s highest education 0.204 0.268 0.332 0.470 0.096 0.075 0.128 0.126
is high school [0.136] [0.172] [0.248] [0.317] [0.132] [0.158] [0.237] [0.290]
Mother’s highest education 0.253 0.234 0.330 0.237 0.310** 0.308* 0.427 0.293
is college [0.154] [0.198] [0.281] [0.383] [0.150] [0.184] [0.271] [0.344]
Father’s highest education 0.104 0.210 0.321 0.537 0.193 0.264 0.481* 0.673*
is college [0.165] [0.226] [0.299] [0.436] [0.162] [0.213] [0.290] [0.399]
First born 0.110 0.186 0.153 0.258 0.143 0.235 0.254 0.436
[0.132] [0.172] [0.238] [0.329] [0.128] [0.157] [0.228] [0.297]
Only child in household 0.128 0.159 0.242 0.385 0.106 0.065 0.189 0.163
[0.126] [0.162] [0.225] [0.306] [0.122] [0.148] [0.217] [0.277]
Math score (8th grade) 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.041*** 0.047*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.039*** 0.041***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007]
Reading score (8th grade) 0.006* 0.011** 0.014** 0.029*** 0.005 0.008* 0.011* 0.019**
[0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.010] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008]
Free & reduced price meal -0.213 -0.222 -0.234 -0.294 -0.160 -0.167 -0.142 -0.166
[0.137] [0.184] [0.251] [0.360] [0.131] [0.167] [0.238] [0.314]
Observations 1,016 820 844 613 1,016 820 844 624
Number of classrooms 63 62 52 48 63 62 52 49
log-likelihood -381.8 -236.9 -276.3 -144.4 -411.2 -275.4 -299.7 -178.7
s.e. in brackets, p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. ”All” includes the entire sample, and ”Known”
is the known graduation status subsample.
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Figure A1. Estimated effect of risk attitudes on high school completion
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Table A1. Choice patterns across the five lotteries in the on-border and off-border
designs as predicted by each theory of behavior under risk
Assumption/Model
Choice Diecidue Neilson’s CPT w/convex CPT w/concave
Pattern Betweenness et al. (2004) (1992) weights weights EUT
SSSSS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SSSSR Yes No No Yes No No
SSSRS No No Yes/No Yes No No
SSSRR No No No Yes No No
SSRSS No No No No No No
SSRSR No No No No No No
SSRRS No No No Yes No No
SSRRR No No No Yes No No
SRSSS Yes No No Yes No No
SRSSR Yes No No Yes No No
SRSRS No No No Yes No No
SRSRR No Yes/No Yes/No Yes No No
SRRSS No No No No No No
SRRSR No No No No No No
SRRRS No No No Yes No No
SRRRR No Yes/No Yes/No Yes No No
RSSSS No Yes/No No No Yes No
RSSSR No No No No Yes No
RSSRS No No No No No No
RSSRR No No No No No No
RSRSS No Yes/No No No Yes No
RSRSR No No No No Yes No
RSRRS Yes No No No Yes No
RSRRR Yes No No No Yes No
RRSSS No No No No Yes No
RRSSR No No No No Yes No
RRSRS No No No No No No
RRSRR No No No No No No
RRRSS No No No No Yes No
RRRSR No No No No Yes No
RRRRS Yes No No No Yes No
RRRRR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
If a choice pattern of choosing the safer (S) or riskier (R) options across the five decisions is predicted by a theory, the column entry
is ”Yes” and if not it is ”No.” In the case that the theoretical prediction differs for the on-border and off-border designs, the column
entry is x/y, with x being whether the pattern is predicted in the on-border design and y being whether it is predicted in the off-border
design. Theories considered in the table are Betweenness, Neilson’s (1992) model, Diecidue et al’s (2004) model, Cumulative prospect
theory (CPT) with convex weighting function, Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) with concave weighting function, and Expected
utility theory (EUT)
Table A1 summarizes the patterns of behavior inconsistent with several assumptions about
decision making under risk. The first column presents the patterns that violate betweenness.
Lotteries I, III and IV allow to test for the betweenness axiom (or any theory that relies on the
linearity of indifference curves). Betweenness implies simultaneously that preferences are quasi-
concave and quasi-convex. Quasi-concavity implies that a lottery that is a linear combination of
two other lotteries will be preferred to the least preferred lottery of the two and quasi-convexity
implies that a lottery that is a linear combination of two other lotteries will be less preferred to the
most preferred of the two lotteries. Both properties imply that decisions in lotteries I, III and IV
should be the same. Betweenness allows only eight possible choice patterns in our experiment.
A set of theories suggests that violation of expected utility theory is due to the fact that
individuals judge certain and risky prospects differently (Neilson, 1992a; Diecidue et al., 2004;
44
Bleichrodt and Schmidt, 2002). These theories can be roughly separated between those that allow
for violation of stochastic dominance (Neilson, 1992b; Diecidue et al., 2004) and those that allow
for violation of transitivity (Bleichrodt and Schmidt, 2002). As shown by Diecidue et al. (2004),
theories that allow for a taste for gambling will violate stochastic dominance due to the fact that
they assume that certain prospects and risky prospects are evaluated by different utility functions.
Diecidue et al. (2004) show that if the independence axiom is assumed to hold among all risky
prospects, preferences can be represented by two functions over money u and v such that one is
the equal to the sum of the other plus a cost of gambling that is defined on either the certain
amount of money or the probabilities defining the gamble. Since Diecidue et al. (2004) assume
that the independence axiom holds on strictly risky gambles we have that their theory predicts
that decisions in lotteries II, IV and V should coincide. In addition, since their theory allows for a
utility representation of preferences that is menu-independent, we have that transitivity must hold
as well. The second column of Table A1 shows that their theory allows six choice patterns.
Neilson (1992a) proposes a theory based on the cardinality of the risky prospects. In particular,
Neilson proposes the use of a utility function un that depends on the cardinality of the prospect,
n. In addition, he suggests a boundary condition implying that |ui(x)| ≥ |uj(x)| for all x, if
i < j. Since utility representation of preferences are menu-independent, we have that Neilson
(1992a) theory exclude intransitive choices. Since expected utility holds for lotteries of the same
cardinality, we have that choices in lotteries II and V should coincide. The boundary condition
implies additional restrictions in choices. In particular, a person choosing prospect (β, xL; 1−β, xM )
over prospect (β, xL; 1 − β, (xL, 1 − α;xH , α)), both with the same cardinality, will reveal that
βu2(xL) + (1−β)u2(xM ) ≥ βu2(xL) + (1−β)[u2(xL)(1−α) +u2(xH)α]. Or, u2(xM ) ≥ u2(xL)(1−
α)+u2(xH)α which implies that u
1(xM ) ≥ u2(xM ) ≥ u2(xL)(1−α)+u2(xH)α. That is, the choice
of S in lottery II implies the choice of S in lottery III. The boundary condition also implies that
u2(xL)(1− α) + u2(xH)α ≥ u3(xL)(1− α) + u3(xH)α and u1(xM ) ≥ u3(xM ). That is, a choice of
S in lottery II must be accompanied of a choice of S in lottery I. Suppose instead that prospect
(β, xL; 1−β, (xL, 1−α;xH , α)) in lottery II is chosen over prospect (β, xL; 1−β, xM ). This implies
that u2(xM ) ≤ u2(xL)(1 − α) + u2(xH)α and consequently βu3(xM ) + (1 − β)[u3(xL)(1 − α) +
u3(xH)α] ≤ u2(xL)(1− α) + u2(xH)α. That is, a choice of R in lottery II must be accompanied of
a choice of R in lottery IV. In sum, Neilson (1992a) theory allows only five possible choice patterns
in our experiment (see column 3 in Table A1).
(Bleichrodt and Schmidt, 2002) propose an alternative theory that prevents violations of stochas-
tic dominance at the cost of allowing intransitivities. (Bleichrodt and Schmidt, 2002) suggest that
a person evaluating a certain outcome (x, 1) against a strictly risky lottery (p, y; 1 − p, z) uses a
utility functional v that is a concave transformation of a function u that is used to evaluate two
strictly risky prospects. This implies that expected utility holds among strictly risky prospects but
fails when certain and risky prospects are compared. Since comparisons are menu-dependent, their
theory can generate intransitivities. Our design, however, prevents intransitivities. To see this,
recall that the three prospects used in lotteries I, III and IV are: A, β(xL, 1−α;xH , α) + (1− β)A
and (xL, 1−α;xH , α). Any intransitive choice pattern necesitates that a person choose differently
in lottery I and in lottery III. However, A  ()β(xL, 1−α;xH , α)+(1−β)A requires that v(A) ≤
(≥)β[v(xL)(1−α)+v(xH)α]+(1−β)v(A) which is equivalent to v(A) ≤ (≥)v(xL)(1−α)+v(xH)α.44
This implies that the theory proposed by Bleichrodt and Schmidt (2002) will exclude intransitive
choices in our environment and therefore coincides with Diecidue et al. (2004) predictions.
We finally consider two variants of rank dependent expected utility (RDEU), RDEU with convex
weighting function (RDEU-cave) and RDEU with concave weighting function (RDEU-vex). As
shown in Harless (1992) the RDEU-cave generates concave indifference curves that fan out at the
base of the triangle and fan in along the left side of the triangle. RDEU-vex implies quasiconvex
preferences and RDEU-cave generates quasiconcave preferences. These preferences are necessarily
transitive. Moreover, a person with quasiconvex preferences will choose S in lottery I if he chooses
S in lottery III and will choose R in lottery IV if he instead chooses R in lottery III. And, a person
44Note that the same argument holds if we start by comparing lottery A to lottery B.
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with quasiconcave preferences will choose S in lottery IV if he chooses S in lottery III and will
choose R in lottery I if he instead chooses R in lottery III. These restrictions plus the pattterns of
fanning implied by the theory are summarized in columns 4 and 5 of Table A1.
Table A2. Estimates of alternative decision models using Harless and Camerer’s
(1994) error choice model
Assumption/Model
Choice Between. Diecidue Neilson CPT w/conv. CPT w/conc. EUT
et al. (2004) (1992) weights weights































RRRRR 0.0558 0.1071 0.1071 0.1225 0.0404 0.1961
error rate 0.2800 0.3251 0.3251 0.2799 0.3084 0.3358
log-likelihood -4194.5 -4247.0 -4247.0 -4199.8 -4237 -4255.3
observations 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,275
If a choice pattern of choosing the safer (S) or riskier (R) option across the five decisions is predicted by a theory, the column entry
reports the maximum likelihood estimate of the probability that such a pattern exists in the data for the error rate level reported
in row “error rate.” For instance, column “Betweenness” shows that the probability that a person has pattern SSSSS is 0.4615 and
column EUT shows that such pattern is estimated to be 0.8039 according to expected utility theory. All estimates combine data from
the on-border and off-border design. Neilson’s (1992) model and Diecidue et al’s (2004) estimation in the off-border design re-assigns
probability to patterns SSSSS and RRRRR according to the preponderances of safe and risky decisions.
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Table A3. Harless and Camerer (1994) error choice model Maximum Likelihood
estimation of irrational behavior assuming expected utility theory
Pr(SSSSS) ε
Variables coefficient S.E. coefficient S.E.
Male -0.2787 0.4116 0.0634 0.0801
Black 0.7798 0.7003 0.1676∗ 0.0978
Age in years -0.1924 0.4642 0.1873∗∗ 0.0898
Two-parent household 0.0885 0.4636 0.0187 0.0890
Mother’s highest educ. is high sch. 0.3413 0.5977 -0.0147 0.1072
Father’s highest educ. is high sch. 0.7075 0.6447 0.1832∗ 0.0971
Mother’s highest educ. is college 0.2469 0.6095 0.0375 0.1177
Father’s highest educ. is college 0.5834 0.5054 -0.1060 0.1061
First born -0.9272 0.4787∗ -0.1348 0.0945
No older siblings in household 0.5472 0.5225 -0.0143 0.0883
Math score (8th grade) -0.0138 0.0068∗∗ -0.0036∗∗ 0.0016
Reading score (8th grade) 0.0101 0.0100 -0.0017 0.0022
On-border design 0.1706 0.4908 0.0213 0.1104
Free/reduced price meal 0.1294 0.4424 0.0012 0.0906
Experiment run in 2011 0.7026 0.6643 0.3019∗∗∗ 0.1156
Constant 6.3610 10.1483 0.9333 2.2585
Observations 1,065
Log-likelihood -3,518.2
Because of the nonlinearity of the estimation, dummies for year in which the experiment was con-
ducted and the on-border design are included in lieu of the 62 classroom dummy variables.
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Table A4. Bootstrap estimation of the effect of estimated risk aversion on disciplinary
referrals (1000 reps) - using specification in Table 7
Parameter No controls Betweenness Neilson Diecidue et al. CPT convex CPT concave EUT
Statistics (1992) (2004) weights weights
Disciplinary referrals 8th grade
Mean -0.315 -0.316 -0.321 -0.327 -0.307 -0.277 -0.323
S.E. 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
q0.05 -0.549 -0.550 -0.550 -0.553 -0.546 -0.512 -0.554
q0.95 0.014 0.014 0.003 -0.014 0.026 0.043 0.008
Disciplinary referrals 9th grade
Mean -0.463 -0.461 -0.473 -0.480 -0.486 -0.448 -0.477
S.E. 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
q0.05 -0.832 -0.831 -0.835 -0.843 -0.851 -0.820 -0.831
q0.95 -0.074 -0.070 -0.092 -0.098 -0.095 -0.058 -0.094
Disciplinary referrals 8th & 9th grade
Mean -0.411 -0.410 -0.420 -0.427 -0.416 -0.381 -0.419
S.E. 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
q0.05 -0.657 -0.658 -0.658 -0.661 -0.666 -0.624 -0.659
q0.95 -0.084 -0.080 -0.103 -0.114 -0.084 -0.058 -0.094
Estimated risk aversion (calculated posteriors) for each child in the sample are recalculated 1,000 using bootstrapped
samples of the population. q0.05 is the estimate for the 5th percentile, and q0.95 is the estimate for the 95th percentile.
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Table A5. Negative binomial regression on cost to rationality
Betweenness Neilson Diecidue CPT CPT
Variables (1992) et al (2004) convex w. concave w. EUT
Male 0.045 0.037 0.051 0.041 -0.039 0.041
[0.044] [0.034] [0.033] [0.058] [0.074] [0.030]
Black 0.082 0.066* 0.024 0.116 -0.099 0.048
[0.051] [0.038] [0.036] [0.079] [0.101] [0.034]
Age in years 0.008 0.057* 0.027 0.019 0.081 0.042
[0.042] [0.033] [0.035] [0.059] [0.070] [0.031]
Two-parent household 0.028 0.045 0.052 0.052 0.029 0.039
[0.056] [0.045] [0.043] [0.074] [0.083] [0.036]
Mother’s highest education -0.091 -0.048 -0.039 -0.021 -0.163* -0.027
is high school [0.058] [0.041] [0.043] [0.079] [0.096] [0.037]
Father’s highest education 0.104* 0.097** 0.096** 0.101 0.099 0.088**
is high school [0.055] [0.046] [0.044] [0.063] [0.102] [0.041]
Mother’s highest education -0.126* -0.058 -0.024 -0.080 -0.019 -0.041
is college [0.075] [0.050] [0.056] [0.093] [0.111] [0.051]
Father’s highest education -0.028 0.056 0.040 0.057 -0.011 0.036
is college [0.083] [0.052] [0.056] [0.085] [0.139] [0.047]
First born -0.076 -0.059 -0.071 -0.019 -0.055 -0.061
[0.054] [0.043] [0.045] [0.070] [0.093] [0.042]
No older siblings in household 0.017 0.005 0.002 0.076 -0.063 0.021
[0.055] [0.043] [0.044] [0.064] [0.078] [0.040]
Math score (8th grade) -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Free/reduced price meal -0.050 0.032 0.077 -0.004 -0.010 0.019
[0.058] [0.050] [0.048] [0.071] [0.090] [0.043]
On-border design -0.013 -0.215*** -0.455*** 0.084 -0.213** 0.010
[0.060] [0.062] [0.060] [0.086] [0.104] [0.054]
Experiment run in 2011 0.044 0.080 0.078 0.123 -0.032 0.075
[0.057] [0.057] [0.056] [0.096] [0.101] [0.055]
Constant 0.439 1.772* 1.159 1.407 -0.754 1.246
[1.300] [0.961] [0.953] [1.514] [2.020] [0.846]
Observations 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065
Log-Likelihood -971.4 -1334 -1254 -1098 -923.3 -1371
Robust standard errors in brackets, clusters at the classroom level. Dummy variables for on-border design and year in which
experiment was run are included in lieu of dummy variables per classroom. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table A6. Fixed effects negative binomial regression on number of disciplinary referrals (8th grade)
Number of safe decisions -0.038 -0.040 -0.048 -0.055* -0.037 -0.034 -0.050





Diecidue et al. (2004) 0.257**
[0.100]
CPT w/ convex weights -0.008
[0.084]




Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Male 0.450*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.449*** 0.450*** 0.456*** 0.449***
[0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079]
Black 0.255*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.261*** 0.255*** 0.264*** 0.259***
[0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Age in years -0.141* -0.140* -0.137* -0.139* -0.141* -0.132* -0.134*
[0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077]
Two-parent household -0.194** -0.193** -0.192** -0.188** -0.194** -0.193** -0.193**
[0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084]
Mother’s highest education -0.041 -0.042 -0.045 -0.041 -0.041 -0.044 -0.041
is high school [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103]
Father’s highest education -0.051 -0.050 -0.047 -0.047 -0.051 -0.043 -0.048
is high school [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] [0.098]
Mother’s highest education 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.026
is college [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119]
Father’s highest education -0.214* -0.214* -0.213* -0.212* -0.214* -0.212* -0.211*
is college [0.123] [0.123] [0.123] [0.123] [0.123] [0.123] [0.123]
First born -0.207** -0.207** -0.211** -0.213** -0.207** -0.210** -0.210**
[0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097]
No older sibling in household -0.175* -0.175* -0.172* -0.180* -0.175* -0.173* -0.174*
[0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Math score (8th grade) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Free/reduced priced meal 0.274** 0.273** 0.281*** 0.285*** 0.273** 0.273** 0.277***
[0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106]
Constant 11.697*** 11.681*** 11.552*** 11.572*** 11.700*** 11.554*** 11.599***
[2.501] [2.501] [2.512] [2.512] [2.501] [2.497] [2.504]
Observations 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060
Number of classrooms 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Log-Likelihood -1454 -1454 -1453 -1451 -1454 -1453 -1453
Robust standard errors in brackets. Fixed effects at the classroom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A7. Fixed effects negative binomial regression on number of disciplinary referrals (9th grade)
Number of safe decisions -0.046 -0.045 -0.066 -0.067 -0.057 -0.044 -0.067





Diecidue et al. (2004) 0.281**
[0.132]
CPT w/ convex weights 0.083
[0.110]




Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.054***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Male 0.144 0.143 0.147 0.145 0.143 0.145 0.143
[0.101] [0.101] [0.101] [0.101] [0.101] [0.101] [0.101]
Black 0.582*** 0.582*** 0.582*** 0.586*** 0.579*** 0.588*** 0.586***
[0.122] [0.122] [0.121] [0.122] [0.122] [0.122] [0.121]
Age in years -0.091 -0.091 -0.083 -0.084 -0.090 -0.087 -0.085
[0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.100] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099]
Two-parent household 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.022
[0.109] [0.109] [0.109] [0.110] [0.110] [0.110] [0.110]
Mother’s highest education 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.007
is high school [0.132] [0.132] [0.132] [0.132] [0.132] [0.132] [0.132]
Father’s highest education -0.120 -0.120 -0.111 -0.108 -0.123 -0.114 -0.112
is high school [0.126] [0.126] [0.126] [0.127] [0.126] [0.127] [0.126]
Mother’s highest education 0.076 0.076 0.087 0.096 0.073 0.074 0.079
is college [0.153] [0.153] [0.153] [0.154] [0.153] [0.153] [0.153]
Father’s highest education -0.274* -0.274* -0.273* -0.269* -0.276* -0.272* -0.267*
is college [0.160] [0.160] [0.159] [0.159] [0.160] [0.160] [0.160]
First born -0.223* -0.222* -0.234* -0.232* -0.221* -0.226* -0.230*
[0.123] [0.123] [0.123] [0.123] [0.123] [0.124] [0.123]
No older sibling in household -0.051 -0.051 -0.036 -0.044 -0.052 -0.049 -0.046
[0.119] [0.120] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.120] [0.119]
Math score (8th grade) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Free/reduced priced meal 0.320** 0.321** 0.341** 0.335** 0.324** 0.320** 0.328**
[0.139] [0.139] [0.140] [0.140] [0.139] [0.139] [0.139]
Constant 10.424*** 10.427*** 10.411*** 10.326*** 10.430*** 10.405*** 10.462***
[3.188] [3.188] [3.200] [3.198] [3.190] [3.187] [3.191]
Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055
Number of classrooms 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Log-Likelihood -1146 -1146 -1144 -1143 -1145 -1145 -1145
Robust standard errors in brackets. Fixed effects at the classroom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A8. Fixed effects negative binomial regression on number of disciplinary referrals (total in 8th and
9th grade)
Number of safe decisions -0.043 -0.042 -0.057* -0.064** -0.046 -0.040 -0.057*





Diecidue et al. (2004) 0.281***
[0.095]
CPT w/ convex weights 0.027
[0.080]




Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.055***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Male 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.291*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.292*** 0.288***
[0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074]
Black 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.353*** 0.358*** 0.349*** 0.360*** 0.355***
[0.088] [0.088] [0.087] [0.088] [0.088] [0.088] [0.088]
Age in years -0.141* -0.141* -0.133* -0.133* -0.141* -0.133* -0.134*
[0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.074] [0.073]
Two-parent household -0.147* -0.147* -0.143* -0.139* -0.145* -0.145* -0.146*
[0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.080]
Mother’s highest education -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.013 -0.017 -0.018 -0.015
is high school [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097]
Father’s highest education -0.078 -0.078 -0.073 -0.072 -0.079 -0.070 -0.074
is high school [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Mother’s highest education 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.031 0.021 0.019 0.023
is college [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113]
Father’s highest education -0.163 -0.163 -0.162 -0.159 -0.164 -0.158 -0.158
is college [0.115] [0.115] [0.115] [0.115] [0.115] [0.115] [0.115]
First born -0.213** -0.213** -0.219** -0.220** -0.213** -0.218** -0.217**
[0.090] [0.090] [0.090] [0.090] [0.090] [0.090] [0.090]
No older sibling in household -0.134 -0.134 -0.129 -0.136 -0.135 -0.131 -0.132
[0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.087]
Math score (8th grade) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Free/reduced priced meal 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.266*** 0.268*** 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.261***
[0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099]
Constant 12.207*** 12.209*** 12.074*** 12.022*** 12.204*** 12.092*** 12.144***
[2.336] [2.336] [2.344] [2.345] [2.337] [2.335] [2.338]
Observations 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060
Number of classrooms 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Log-Likelihood -1834 -1834 -1832 -1830 -1834 -1833 -1833
Robust standard errors in brackets. Fixed effects at the classroom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A9. Fixed effects negative binomial regression on number of disciplinary referrals (8th
grade)
Risk taking in D1 0.156*
[0.083]
Risk taking in D2 0.018
[0.083]
Risk taking in D3 0.030
[0.084]
Risk taking in D4 0.098
[0.081]
Risk taking in D5 -0.017
[0.084]
Expected utility 0.117 0.091 0.092 0.112 0.079
[0.119] [0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.124]
Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.060***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Male 0.456*** 0.450*** 0.450*** 0.451*** 0.451***
[0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079]
Black 0.263*** 0.258*** 0.260*** 0.254*** 0.259***
[0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Age in years -0.123 -0.129* -0.131* -0.129* -0.128*
[0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077]
Two-parent household -0.202** -0.199** -0.198** -0.194** -0.199**
[0.083] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084]
Mother’s highest education -0.041 -0.047 -0.044 -0.037 -0.046
is high school [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103]
Father’s highest education -0.038 -0.043 -0.046 -0.050 -0.044
is high school [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] [0.098]
Mother’s highest education 0.026 0.022 0.024 0.027 0.022
is college [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119]
Father’s highest education -0.212* -0.216* -0.217* -0.214* -0.217*
is college [0.123] [0.123] [0.123] [0.123] [0.124]
First born -0.209** -0.208** -0.208** -0.208** -0.208**
college [0.096] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097]
No older siblings in household -0.172* -0.175* -0.173* -0.170* -0.173*
college [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Math score (8th grade) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Free/reduced price meal 0.278*** 0.282*** 0.280*** 0.288*** 0.282***
[0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106]
Constant 11.424*** 11.649*** 11.671*** 11.629*** 11.713***
[2.498] [2.514] [2.503] [2.506] [2.500]
Observations 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060
Number of classrooms 62 62 62 62 62
Log-Likelihood -1453 -1454 -1454 -1454 -1454
Robust standard errors in brackets. Fixed effects at the classroom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A10. Fixed effects negative binomial regression on number of disciplinary referrals (9th
grade)
Risk taking in D1 0.082
[0.108]
Risk taking in D2 0.132
[0.107]
Risk taking in D3 0.013
[0.109]
Risk taking in D4 0.144
[0.105]
Risk taking in D5 0.010
[0.109]
Expected utility 0.172 0.188 0.158 0.195 0.159
[0.152] [0.153] [0.152] [0.153] [0.157]
Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Male 0.145 0.145 0.143 0.149 0.142
[0.101] [0.101] [0.101] [0.101] [0.102]
Black 0.594*** 0.583*** 0.590*** 0.585*** 0.589***
[0.122] [0.121] [0.121] [0.121] [0.121]
Age in years -0.074 -0.072 -0.076 -0.077 -0.076
[0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099]
bothparents 0.017 0.021 0.019 0.022 0.018
[0.109] [0.109] [0.110] [0.109] [0.109]
Mother’s highest education -0.002 -0.010 -0.005 0.011 -0.005
is high school [0.132] [0.132] [0.132] [0.132] [0.132]
Father’s highest education -0.102 -0.113 -0.108 -0.115 -0.107
is high school [0.127] [0.127] [0.127] [0.126] [0.126]
Mother’s highest education 0.070 0.073 0.070 0.081 0.070
is college [0.153] [0.153] [0.153] [0.153] [0.153]
Father’s highest education -0.278* -0.288* -0.284* -0.279* -0.283*
is college [0.159] [0.160] [0.159] [0.159] [0.160]
First born -0.227* -0.221* -0.226* -0.225* -0.226*
[0.123] [0.124] [0.123] [0.123] [0.123]
No older siblings in household -0.051 -0.062 -0.052 -0.046 -0.053
[0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119]
Math score (8th grade) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Free/reduced price meal 0.325** 0.322** 0.326** 0.342** 0.327**
[0.139] [0.139] [0.139] [0.139] [0.139]
Constant 10.339*** 10.144*** 10.419*** 10.314*** 10.433***
[3.187] [3.189] [3.186] [3.189] [3.186]
Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055
Number of classrooms 60 60 60 60 60
Log-Likelihood -1145 -1145 -1146 -1145 -1146
Robust standard errors in brackets. Fixed effects at the classroom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A11. Fixed effects negative binomial regression on number of disciplinary referrals
(total in 8th and 9th grade)
Risk taking in D1 0.133*
[0.079]
Risk taking in D2 0.044
[0.079]
Risk taking in D3 0.040
[0.079]
Risk taking in D4 0.120
[0.077]
Risk taking in D5 -0.017
[0.079]
Expected utility 0.117 0.099 0.096 0.122 0.081
[0.112] [0.113] [0.112] [0.113] [0.116]
Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Male 0.293*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.292*** 0.290***
[0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074]
Black 0.361*** 0.354*** 0.357*** 0.350*** 0.355***
[0.088] [0.088] [0.088] [0.087] [0.088]
Age in years -0.123* -0.127* -0.130* -0.127* -0.126*
[0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073]
Two-parent household -0.153* -0.149* -0.149* -0.145* -0.150*
[0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.079] [0.080]
Mother’s highest education -0.019 -0.025 -0.020 -0.011 -0.022
is high school [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097]
Father’s highest education -0.061 -0.069 -0.071 -0.077 -0.068
is high school [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Mother’s highest education 0.019 0.017 0.020 0.026 0.018
is college [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113]
Father’s highest education -0.159 -0.169 -0.168 -0.166 -0.170
is college [0.115] [0.115] [0.115] [0.115] [0.116]
First born -0.217** -0.213** -0.215** -0.213** -0.213**
[0.090] [0.090] [0.090] [0.090] [0.090]
No older siblings in household -0.132 -0.138 -0.133 -0.132 -0.135
[0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.087]
Math score (8th grade) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Free/reduced price meal 0.261*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.274*** 0.265***
[0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099]
Constant 11.973*** 12.071*** 12.125*** 12.066*** 12.170***
[2.335] [2.340] [2.337] [2.339] [2.333]
Observations 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060
Number of classrooms 62 62 62 62 62
Log-Likelihood -1833 -1834 -1834 -1833 -1834
Robust standard errors in brackets. Fixed effects at the classroom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A12. Fixed effects negative binomial regression of disciplinary acts (8th grade)
Pr(AAAAA|Choice)+ -0.459** -0.459** -0.461** -0.465** -0.454* -0.408* -0.464**





Diecidue et al. (2004) 0.224**
[0.098]
CPT w/ convex weights -0.008
[0.081]




Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.061***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Male 0.439*** 0.440*** 0.440*** 0.438*** 0.440*** 0.446*** 0.439***
[0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079]
Black 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.299*** 0.303*** 0.297*** 0.300*** 0.300***
[0.096] [0.096] [0.096] [0.095] [0.096] [0.096] [0.096]
Age in years -0.140* -0.139* -0.135* -0.134* -0.140* -0.131* -0.134*
[0.076] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.076] [0.077] [0.077]
Two-parent household -0.193** -0.192** -0.193** -0.190** -0.193** -0.193** -0.194**
[0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.084] [0.083] [0.083]
Mother’s highest education -0.020 -0.021 -0.024 -0.021 -0.020 -0.025 -0.021
is high school [0.104] [0.104] [0.104] [0.104] [0.104] [0.104] [0.104]
Father’s highest education -0.016 -0.015 -0.011 -0.009 -0.016 -0.012 -0.012
is high school [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099]
Mother’s highest education 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.042
is college [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119]
Father’s highest education -0.195 -0.195 -0.195 -0.195 -0.195 -0.196 -0.194
is college [0.124] [0.124] [0.124] [0.123] [0.124] [0.124] [0.124]
First born -0.254** -0.254** -0.258*** -0.259*** -0.254** -0.252** -0.257**
[0.100] [0.100] [0.100] [0.100] [0.100] [0.100] [0.100]
No older sibling in household -0.153 -0.153 -0.150 -0.157* -0.153 -0.154* -0.152
[0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Math score (8th grade) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Free/reduced price meal 0.278*** 0.278*** 0.284*** 0.290*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.281***
[0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106] [0.106]
Constant 12.242*** 12.239*** 12.151*** 12.174*** 12.237*** 12.055*** 12.199***
[2.508] [2.507] [2.516] [2.517] [2.508] [2.508] [2.510]
Observations 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060
Number of classrooms 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Log-Likelihood -1453 -1453 -1452 -1450 -1453 -1452 -1452
+Pr(Choice) = Pr(Choice|α, ε)α + Pr(Choice|1 − α, ε)(1 − α), α = Pr(AAAAA). Pr(AAAAA|Choice) =
Pr(Choice|α,ε)α
Pr(Choice)
Robust standard errors in brackets. Fixed effects at the classroom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table A13. Fixed effects negative binomial regression of disciplinary acts (9th grade)
Pr(AAAAA|Choice)+ -0.644** -0.644** -0.642** -0.653** -0.681** -0.627** -0.651**





Diecidue et al. (2004) 0.238*
[0.128]
CPT w/ convex weights 0.078
[0.106]




Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.055***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Male 0.129 0.127 0.131 0.129 0.128 0.130 0.128
[0.102] [0.102] [0.102] [0.102] [0.101] [0.102] [0.102]
Black 0.643*** 0.642*** 0.644*** 0.648*** 0.644*** 0.645*** 0.648***
[0.125] [0.125] [0.125] [0.125] [0.125] [0.125] [0.125]
Age in years -0.087 -0.089 -0.077 -0.077 -0.085 -0.085 -0.080
[0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.098] [0.099] [0.099]
Two-parent household 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.029 0.031 0.029 0.024
[0.109] [0.109] [0.109] [0.109] [0.109] [0.109] [0.109]
Mother’s highest education 0.040 0.042 0.038 0.041 0.035 0.038 0.037
is high school [0.134] [0.134] [0.134] [0.134] [0.134] [0.134] [0.134]
Father’s highest education -0.071 -0.072 -0.062 -0.059 -0.071 -0.070 -0.064
is high school [0.128] [0.128] [0.128] [0.128] [0.128] [0.129] [0.128]
Mother’s highest education 0.102 0.102 0.109 0.118 0.099 0.101 0.103
is college [0.154] [0.154] [0.154] [0.155] [0.155] [0.154] [0.154]
Father’s highest education -0.243 -0.242 -0.248 -0.245 -0.245 -0.242 -0.242
is college [0.161] [0.161] [0.160] [0.160] [0.161] [0.161] [0.161]
First born -0.284** -0.284** -0.292** -0.292** -0.286** -0.284** -0.290**
[0.127] [0.127] [0.127] [0.127] [0.127] [0.127] [0.127]
No older sibling in household -0.025 -0.026 -0.014 -0.020 -0.025 -0.024 -0.023
[0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.120]
Math score (8th grade) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Free/reduced price meal 0.330** 0.331** 0.347** 0.343** 0.333** 0.329** 0.335**
[0.139] [0.139] [0.139] [0.139] [0.139] [0.139] [0.139]
Constant 10.980*** 10.988*** 10.988*** 10.927*** 11.031*** 10.952*** 11.023***
[3.193] [3.193] [3.202] [3.201] [3.195] [3.194] [3.194]
Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055
Number of classrooms 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Log-Likelihood -1144 -1144 -1143 -1142 -1144 -1144 -1143
+Pr(Choice) = Pr(Choice|α, ε)α + Pr(Choice|1 − α, ε)(1 − α), α = Pr(AAAAA). Pr(AAAAA|Choice) =
Pr(Choice|α,ε)α
Pr(Choice)
Robust standard errors in brackets. Fixed effects at the classroom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table A14. Fixed effects negative binomial regression of disciplinary acts (total from 8th and 9th grades)
Pr(AAAAA|Choice)+ -0.579*** -0.579*** -0.582*** -0.586*** -0.592*** -0.541** -0.584***





Diecidue et al. (2004) 0.240***
[0.092]
CPT w/ convex weights 0.025
[0.077]




Disciplinary referrals (7th grade) 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.056***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Male 0.275*** 0.274*** 0.277*** 0.275*** 0.274*** 0.279*** 0.274***
[0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074]
Black 0.404*** 0.403*** 0.407*** 0.412*** 0.404*** 0.408*** 0.408***
[0.090] [0.090] [0.090] [0.090] [0.090] [0.090] [0.090]
Age in years -0.139* -0.140* -0.130* -0.128* -0.138* -0.133* -0.133*
[0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073]
Two-parent household -0.144* -0.144* -0.143* -0.140* -0.143* -0.143* -0.145*
[0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079]
Mother’s highest education 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.009
is high school [0.098] [0.098] [0.097] [0.097] [0.098] [0.098] [0.097]
Father’s highest education -0.034 -0.035 -0.028 -0.025 -0.033 -0.031 -0.030
is high school [0.094] [0.094] [0.094] [0.094] [0.094] [0.094] [0.094]
Mother’s highest education 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.048 0.040 0.039 0.042
is college [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113] [0.113]
Father’s highest education -0.137 -0.136 -0.138 -0.137 -0.137 -0.135 -0.135
is college [0.116] [0.116] [0.116] [0.115] [0.116] [0.116] [0.116]
First born -0.271*** -0.270*** -0.275*** -0.276*** -0.271*** -0.270*** -0.273***
[0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
No older sibling in household -0.107 -0.108 -0.103 -0.109 -0.107 -0.107 -0.106
[0.088] [0.088] [0.087] [0.087] [0.088] [0.088] [0.087]
Math score (8th grade) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Reading score (8th grade) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Free/reduced price meal 0.260*** 0.261*** 0.270*** 0.273*** 0.262*** 0.260*** 0.264***
[0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099]
Constant 12.838*** 12.846*** 12.752*** 12.710*** 12.854*** 12.701*** 12.809***
[2.341] [2.341] [2.347] [2.348] [2.342] [2.343] [2.342]
Observations 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060
Number of classrooms 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Log-Likelihood -1831 -1831 -1830 -1828 -1831 -1831 -1831
+Pr(Choice) = Pr(Choice|α, ε)α + Pr(Choice|1 − α, ε)(1 − α), α = Pr(AAAAA). Pr(AAAAA|Choice) =
Pr(Choice|α,ε)α
Pr(Choice)
Robust standard errors in brackets. Fixed effects at the classroom level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table A15. Fixed effects negative binomial regression on disci-
plinary referrals using estimated risk measure (latent factor)
(1) (2) (3)
8th grade 9th grade 8th & 9th grade
Empirical Bayes means for fi 0.055 0.049 0.061
[0.052] [0.067] [0.049]
Consistent with expected utility theory 0.112 0.187 0.123
[0.123] [0.156] [0.116]
Disciplinary referrals in 7th grade 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.055***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.004]
Male 0.450*** 0.145 0.289***
[0.079] [0.101] [0.074]
Black 0.258*** 0.589*** 0.356***
[0.094] [0.121] [0.088]
Age -0.128* -0.075 -0.126*
[0.077] [0.099] [0.073]
Two-parent household -0.199** 0.019 -0.151*
[0.084] [0.109] [0.080]
Mother’s highest education -0.047 -0.002 -0.021
is high school [0.103] [0.132] [0.097]
Father’s highest education -0.043 -0.108 -0.069
is high school [0.098] [0.126] [0.093]
Mother’s highest education 0.027 0.074 0.023
is college [0.119] [0.153] [0.113]
Father’s highest education -0.218* -0.282* -0.167
is college [0.123] [0.159] [0.115]
First born -0.202** -0.226* -0.211**
[0.097] [0.123] [0.090]
No older siblings in household -0.180* -0.052 -0.138
[0.093] [0.119] [0.087]
Math score 8th grade -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Reading score 8th grade -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Free/reduced price meal 0.276*** 0.325** 0.259***
[0.107] [0.139] [0.099]
Constant 11.559*** 10.359*** 11.996***
[2.520] [3.187] [2.350]
Observations 1,058 1,055 1,058
Number of classrooms 61 60 61
log-likelihood -1452 -1145 -1831
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table A16. Effect of estimated risk latent factor on completing high school
Academy graduates included Academy graduates counted as dropouts
Probit Logit Probit Logit
Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects
VARIABLES All Known All Known All Known All Known
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Empirical Bayes means for fi -0.015 -0.043 -0.031 -0.211 0.005 0.064 -0.010 0.034
[0.151] [0.191] [0.277] [0.373] [0.146] [0.177] [0.264] [0.333]
(0.919) (0.823) (0.911) (0.572) (0.972) (0.718) (0.969) (0.919)
f2i -0.110 0.050 -0.150 0.090 -0.127 0.037 -0.123 0.058
[0.176] [0.227] [0.316] [0.433] [0.172] [0.212] [0.305] [0.391]
(0.534) (0.826) (0.634) (0.835) (0.460) (0.863) (0.686) (0.882)
f3i 0.023 -0.076 0.012 -0.082 -0.004 -0.150 -0.039 -0.212
[0.138] [0.174] [0.253] [0.342] [0.135] [0.163] [0.243] [0.306]
(0.870) (0.664) (0.962) (0.811) (0.976) (0.357) (0.873) (0.488)
Disciplinary ref. in 7th grade -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.178*** -0.188*** -0.113*** -0.100*** -0.186*** -0.168***
[0.019] [0.023] [0.034] [0.043] [0.019] [0.022] [0.035] [0.041]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Math standardized sc. in 8th grade 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.039*** 0.041***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Read. standardized sc. in 8th grade 0.006* 0.012** 0.014** 0.029*** 0.006 0.008** 0.011* 0.019**
[0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008]
(0.065) (0.013) (0.032) (0.002) (0.102) (0.050) (0.080) (0.023)
Male -0.191* -0.010 -0.317 -0.010 -0.128 0.021 -0.189 0.056
[0.107] [0.137] [0.194] [0.258] [0.104] [0.127] [0.185] [0.233]
(0.076) (0.942) (0.102) (0.969) (0.218) (0.866) (0.308) (0.809)
Black 0.267** 0.403*** 0.467** 0.632** 0.218* 0.280** 0.388* 0.471*
[0.119] [0.156] [0.217] [0.300] [0.115] [0.142] [0.206] [0.269]
(0.025) (0.010) (0.031) (0.035) (0.058) (0.049) (0.060) (0.080)
Age (years) -0.206** -0.463*** -0.360** -0.978*** -0.207** -0.409*** -0.356** -0.783***
[0.099] [0.129] [0.179] [0.248] [0.097] [0.121] [0.174] [0.222]
(0.038) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.034) (0.001) (0.040) (0.000)
Two-parent HH. 0.271** 0.221 0.440** 0.386 0.227** 0.177 0.363* 0.328
[0.116] [0.149] [0.207] [0.280] [0.112] [0.138] [0.199] [0.254]
(0.019) (0.137) (0.033) (0.168) (0.043) (0.200) (0.067) (0.196)
Mother has HS 0.422*** 0.480*** 0.589** 0.758** 0.487*** 0.572*** 0.703*** 0.843***
[0.136] [0.169] [0.246] [0.327] [0.132] [0.158] [0.237] [0.294]
(0.002) (0.004) (0.017) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004)
Father has HS 0.220* 0.302* 0.347 0.504 0.111 0.104 0.150 0.153
[0.133] [0.166] [0.243] [0.309] [0.128] [0.152] [0.231] [0.282]
(0.098) (0.069) (0.153) (0.103) (0.384) (0.493) (0.517) (0.588)
Mother has college 0.292* 0.294 0.361 0.343 0.349** 0.360** 0.453* 0.351
[0.153] [0.196] [0.278] [0.379] [0.148] [0.182] [0.267] [0.339]
(0.056) (0.135) (0.194) (0.365) (0.019) (0.048) (0.090) (0.301)
Father has college 0.152 0.300 0.383 0.623 0.228 0.335* 0.518* 0.717*
[0.158] [0.215] [0.288] [0.419] [0.156] [0.202] [0.280] [0.382]
(0.335) (0.163) (0.183) (0.137) (0.142) (0.098) (0.064) (0.060)
First born 0.117 0.189 0.170 0.305 0.138 0.214 0.243 0.432
[0.127] [0.162] [0.228] [0.307] [0.123] [0.149] [0.218] [0.279]
(0.357) (0.242) (0.456) (0.320) (0.262) (0.150) (0.266) (0.121)
Only child in HH 0.128 0.180 0.230 0.353 0.107 0.098 0.186 0.162
[0.124] [0.159] [0.222] [0.298] [0.120] [0.146] [0.214] [0.272]
(0.304) (0.257) (0.300) (0.236) (0.373) (0.502) (0.384) (0.551)
Consistent with EU -0.037 -0.172 -0.106 -0.366 0.029 -0.071 -0.095 -0.259
[0.229] [0.297] [0.418] [0.578] [0.224] [0.277] [0.403] [0.518]
(0.872) (0.564) (0.801) (0.527) (0.898) (0.796) (0.814) (0.617)
[0.834] [0.818] [0.674] [0.778]
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 1,016 820 844 613 1,016 820 844 624
Number of class rooms 63 62 52 48 63 62 52 49
log-likelihood -384.3 -240.4 -278.6 -149.2 -412.8 -278.1 -301.9 -183.1
s.e. in brackets, p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. ”All” includes the entire sample, and ”Known”
is the subsample for whom graduation status is known.
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Below are 2 options showing you what you can earn when a numbered ball is chosen from the bingo 
cage. Choose the one you like best (A or B) by drawing a circle around it. CHOOSE ONLY ONE.  
 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE OPTION 
 





























REMEMBER:  Only one of these six decisions will count. Treat each decision seriously 
and separately. 
 




Each page should have one (1) circle on it when you’re done. 
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Below are 2 options showing you what you can earn when a numbered ball is chosen from the bingo 
cage. Choose the one you like best (A or B) by drawing a circle around it. CHOOSE ONLY ONE.  
 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE OPTION 
 
































REMEMBER:  Only one of these six decisions will count. Treat each decision seriously 
and separately. 
 




Each page should have one (1) circle on it when you’re done. 























16 $30 16 








Below are 2 options showing you what you can earn when a numbered ball is chosen from the bingo 
cage. Choose the one you like best (A or B) by drawing a circle around it. CHOOSE ONLY ONE.  
 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE OPTION 
 






























REMEMBER:  Only one of these six decisions will count. Treat each decision seriously 
and separately. 
 
You don’t know which one will count until you have made all your decisions. 
 
 
Each page should have one (1) circle on it when you’re done. 
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Below are 2 options showing you what you can earn when a numbered ball is chosen from the bingo 
cage. Choose the one you like best (A or B) by drawing a circle around it. CHOOSE ONLY ONE.  
 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE OPTION 
 






























REMEMBER:  Only one of these six decisions will count. Treat each decision seriously 
and separately. 
 




Each page should have one (1) circle on it when you’re done. 
A  B 
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Below are 2 options showing you what you can earn when a numbered ball is chosen from the bingo 
cage. Choose the one you like best (A or B) by drawing a circle around it. CHOOSE ONLY ONE.  
 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE OPTION 
 






























REMEMBER:  Only one of these six decisions will count. Treat each decision seriously 
and separately. 
 




Each page should have one (1) circle on it when you’re done. 































Below are 2 options showing you what you can earn when a numbered ball is chosen from the bingo 
cage. Choose the one you like best (A or B) by drawing a circle around it.  CHOOSE ONLY ONE. 
CIRCLE THE ONE OPTION (A or B) THAT YOU LIKE BEST 
REMEMBER:  Only one of these six decisions will count. Treat each decision seriously and 
separately. You don’t know which one will count until you have made all your decisions. 
 
This page should have one (1) circle on it when you’re done. 
A  B   
   
1-80 $30 
     
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
     
81-84 $0   
  
85-100 $40 
     
        
97-100 $40 
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DECISION 3 
Below are 2 options showing you what you can earn when a numbered ball is chosen from the bingo 
cage. Choose the one you like best (A or B) by drawing a circle around it.  CHOOSE ONLY ONE. 
CIRCLE THE ONE OPTION (A or B) THAT YOU LIKE BEST 
 
REMEMBER:  Only one of these six decisions will count. Treat each decision seriously and 
separately. You don’t know which one will count until you have made all your decisions. 
 
This page should have one (1) circle on it when you’re done. 
A 
 




     
6-84 $0 
       
       
21-96 $0 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
  
85-100 $40 
     
      
97-100 $40 
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DECISION 4 
Below are 2 options showing you what you can earn when a numbered ball is chosen from the bingo 
cage. Choose the one you like best (A or B) by drawing a circle around it.  CHOOSE ONLY ONE. 
CIRCLE THE ONE OPTION (A or B) THAT YOU LIKE BEST 
REMEMBER:  Only one of these six decisions will count. Treat each decision seriously and 
separately. You don’t know which one will count until you have made all your decisions. 
 








     
       
       
 
21-36 $0 
      
       
   
37-100 $40 
    
       
       
       
       
       
    
81-84 $0 
   
 
85-100 $40 
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DECISION 5 
Below are 2 options showing you what you can earn when a numbered ball is chosen from the bingo 
cage. Choose the one you like best (A or B) by drawing a circle around it.  CHOOSE ONLY ONE. 
CIRCLE THE ONE OPTION (A or B) THAT YOU LIKE BEST 
REMEMBER:  Only one of these six decisions will count. Treat each decision seriously and 
separately. You don’t know which one will count until you have made all your decisions. 
 
This page should have one (1) circle on it when you’re done. 
A 
 
B   
   
1-20 $30 
     
       
       
 
21-36 $0 
      
       
  
37-100 $40 
     
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
        
97-100 $40 
 













































































Below are 2 options showing you what you can earn when a numbered ball is chosen from the bingo 
cage. Choose the one you like best (A or B) by drawing a circle around it.  CHOOSE ONLY ONE. 
CIRCLE THE ONE OPTION (A or B) THAT YOU LIKE BEST 
 
REMEMBER:  Only one of these six decisions will count. Treat each decision seriously and 
separately. You don’t know which one will count until you have made all your decisions. 
 
This page should have one (1) circle on it when you’re done. 
A  B   
   
1-5 $30 
     
6-9 $0     
10-100 $40 
   
       
   
22-100 $40 
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Please do not talk to the other students while completing this survey. 
 
Please complete the following 7 questions. Put an X next to the answer that best answers the 
question for you.   
 
Please complete all the questions to the best of your ability.   
 
Remember your answers are confidential and no one from your school or your home will see 
your responses to these questions.  
 
 
1. Put an X next to the answer that best describes you. Choose only one answer:   
 Your mother’s only child_________ 
 Your mother’s first-born child ____  
 Your mother’s last-born child ____   
 A middle child (not your mother’s oldest child, but not her youngest, either) ______ 
 
 
2. Do you have any older brothers, sisters, step-brothers or step-sisters who live with you 
now?   
 Yes_____  No_____ 
 
 
3. How many of your parents live with you?  Include step-parents in your answer. 
 0______  1______   2______ 
 
 
4. Did your mother graduate from high school? 
 Yes____  No_____   I don’t know_______ 
 
 
5. Did your mother graduate from college?    
 Yes_____   No____  I don’t know_______ 
 
 
6. Did your father graduate from high school? 
 Yes____  No_____   I don’t know_______ 
 
 
7. Did your father graduate from college?    
 Yes_____   No____  I don’t know_______ 
 
Post-experiment survey
72
